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BRIEF OF APPEALANT
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102(3), Utah Code Ann.
§78A-4-103(2).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Should the Court have granted a new trial after Plaintiffs lost their "deficient"
legal counsel for the 2nd time and were forced to become Pro Se litigants. This issue was
preserved by motion and/or objection when denied the motion.
Standard of Review. This issue presents a question based not only on the
deficiencies of legal council, but did the deficiencies affect the outcome of the trial? State
v. Winward. 941 P.2d 627, 635 (Utah Ct.App. 1997), State v. Garrett. 849 P.2d 578, 579
(Utah Ct.App. 1993), State v. Weaver. 2005 UT 49, State v. Hansen. 2002 UT 114.
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2. Did the lower court commit reversible error when it allowed the Defense to
illegally overturn the Federal Court ruling of Judge Jenkins' of March 5, 1995 when
Defendants1 misrepresented correct vacation pay dates, the words "terminate" versus
"discharge", and through Judge Pat Brian's Memorandum Decision misquoting from the
BLA (Basic Labor Agreement) Forfeiture Language by stating that the Plaintiffs' were
"effectively discharge" (Exhibit I, page 11, paragraph 2).
Standard of Review. This issue presents questions of law which are reviewed for
correctness. Basic Labor Agreement BLA §12-A-l-b, BLA §12-A-3, UCC §2-106 (3),
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), Judge Pat Brian's Memorandum
Decision (Sept 22, 2005), Tony Pickering v. USX Corp. (case no. 87-C-8381 and
consolidated cases), Seaman v. Arvida Realty Sales, 985 F.2d 543 (11th Cir. 1993),
Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357 (Utah App. 1993). Hill v. Allred. 2001 UT 16 28 P3d
1271. Alexander v. Oklahoma. 382 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2004), Morris v. Wise, 1955 OK
297, Robinson v. Morrow, 2004 UT App 285, Wells Fargo Bank v. Temple View
Investments. 2003 UT App 441 82 P.3d 655.
3. Should the court have corrected its own error when the Defense mislead the
lower Court into the judicial errors by misrepresenting the accrued 1987 vacation pay as
accrued 1988 vacation pay? (Reference Exhibit I, J, and C). This issue was preserved
by motion and/or objection.
Standard of Review. This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed for
correctness. ERISA, BLA §12-A-3, UCC §2-106.
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4. Did the lower court commit reversible judicial errors when it dismissed this case
for Statute of Limitations even though Appellant did not discover the Defendants' made
misrepresentation to the Court until mid 2006 when Plaintiffs1 legal council withdrew.
(Ref: Exhibit B (pages 39-41) and Exhibit N).
Standard of Review. This issue presents a question of law pertaining to tolling
time period under the Discovery Rule which is reviewed for correctness. Hill v. Allred,
2001 UT 16, 28 P.3d 1271, Discovery Rule.
5. Did the lower court commit judicial errors when it dismissed this case for
Statute of Limitations in the face of appellee misrepresentations, appellant preservations,
unresolved material facts, and no party had motioned for Statute of Limitations?
Additionally, because Statute of Limitations issue had already been won in Pat Brian's
Memorandum Decision December 5, 2003 (Exhibit D).
Standard of Review. This issue is a proven fact (see Exhibit D) and review for
correctness.
6. Did the lower court commit judicial errors when it dismissed this case for
Statute of Limitations in the face of its own prior judicial errors of which it had been
noticed by appellant's motions and objections? (Reference Exhibit C). Additionally, the
history of this case clearly shows that nearly two years of this delay was caused by the
court's own conflict of interests and deficiencies of Plaintiffs' counsel.
Standard of Review. This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed for
correctness. Wells Fargo Bank v. Temple View Investments, 2003 UT App 441 82 P.3d
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655
7. Defendants' entered unauthenticated inadmissible accounting documents into
evidence(Exhibit L) in which Plaintiffs filed objections and memorandum in the attempt
to stop and correct. Should the court have reviewed Plaintiffs' material issues and
provided argument time for the motions on these issues instead of ignoring the issues? .
Standard of Review. This issue presents a question of law pertaining to summary
judgment when material facts remain in question which is reviewed for correctness.
Gardner v. County. 2008 UT 6 178 P.3d 893.
8. Did the lower court commit reversible error when it illegally modified the
meaning of the Basic Labor Agreement by switching the word "terminate" for the words
"effectively discharge"? And also when it misinterpreted and then misquoted the vacation
pay eligibility requirements? And again when it ignored Plaintiffs opposing evidence
pertaining to BLA § 8-A and 8-B Suspension and Discharge Procedures that absolutely
prove that Plaintiffs were terminated, but not discharged?
Standard of Review. This issue presents a question of law pertaining to summary
judgment when material facts remain in question, of overturning a prior Federal Court
ruling, and of non-parties modification of the Basic Labor Agreement which is reviewed
for correctness. Wells Fargo Bank v. Temple View Investments, 2003 UT App 441 82
P.3d 655. UCC 2-106(3), BLA §12-A-l-b, BLA §12-A-3, BLA § 8-A and 8-B, UCC §2106(3).

4-50

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following relevant statutes, codes, agreements are attached in Addendum A:
UCC §2-106(3) (Contracts)
ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974) §502(a)
BLA §12-A-3 (Forfeiture clause for vacation pay)
BLA § 8-A and 8-B (Suspension and Discharge Procedures)
BLA §12-A-l-b (Vacation Pay Eligibility Requirements)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
We the pro se Plaintiffs appeal from the decisions and judgments of the Third
District Court in its denying the pro se Plaintiffs a fair chance to plead their case. The
lower court ignored Plaintiffs objections, motions, and evidence and then unjustly
dismissed on Statue of Limitations. Plaintiffs were not given opportunity to argue the
dismissal. There were material issues pending.
This case was filed on July 30, 2001 and is about Fraudulent Misrepresentation,
Legal Malpractice (Breach of Contract), Legal Malpractice (Breach of Fiduciary Duty),
Legal Malpractice (Negligence), Accounting, and Breach of Trust. Specifically, this case
is about Alan Young's handling of the Pickering v. tTSXcase, the monies Alan Young
received in the Picking v. t/SXcase and, why he has not paid the correct award monies
owed to Plaintiffs from the Pickering v. USX case. This lawsuit questions what Alan
Young do with the award money and vacation pay in the form of transparent and
auditable accounting of the source, amount, and distribution. Additionally, this case is
about lost increased pensions through negligence and fraud as well as unaccounted for
legal fees. However, Alan Young attempted to turn this case into an argument about
5-50

whether money was owed at all and has never shown Plaintiffs any true authenticated
accounting records toward his defense.
Originally, Plaintiffs' were not self represented as pro see litigants, but two
attempts to hire counsel resulted in their attorneys withdrawing from the case. Plaintiffs
were forced to become pro se litigants in June of 2006. Plaintiffs' two attorneys failed to
plead the facts of the case and failed to preserving critical issues. When Plaintiffs
confronted their attorneys for not performing, the attorneys withdrew from this lawsuit.
Attorney Alan Young was the lead attorney representing Plaintiffs in a previous
case of Pickering v. USX filed on or about April 10, 1987 (RE: CV00838). In the
Pickering case, Alan Young controlled the distribution of the settlement funds. On or
about April 2001, while some Plaintiffs were attending a lawsuit of Chamberlain v.
Young and while listening to the testimony of Judge Scott Daniels on the topic of
distribution of "slush fund" monies from the Pickering v. f/SXcase, Plaintiffs discovered
that Alan Young still owed to Plaintiffs additional award monies, including vacation pay
from the Pickering case. Plaintiff Chilton communicated with the court on these facts as
can be seen in Judge Pat Brian's Memorandum Decision (Defendant's Motion to Dismiss)
dated December 5, 2003, (Exhibit D, page 3, paragraph 3 ) and related letters from
Plaintiff Chilton (Exhibit G).
In July of 2001, Plaintiffs hired attorney James Haskins to sue attorney Alan
Young along with the other attorneys who worked with Alan Young on the Pickering v.
USX case to recover those remaining award monies and in so doing, gave rise to this
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instant lawsuit.
On December 16, 2001, Alan Young Hied a motion to dismiss. On January 2,
2002, Judge Tyron Medley dismissed this case without prejudice for Attorney Haskins'
failure to serve papers to Alan Young in the proper time. This case was refiled in
February 08, 2002 and served on April 16, 2002. The case I hi n stalled in iht* l(h district
court in Provo where no judge would hear the case because of a conflict of interest on the
grounds that they were friends with Defendant Alan Young. Months later, Judge Claudia
Laycock was appointed to the case. In or about September 2002, Laycock set a status
hearing and at that hearing, Laycock recused herself from the case on the grounds of
conflict of interest in that she had been recommended by Attorney Micheal Petro who
was at that time, Alan Young's counsel attorney in this lawsuit.
On or about July 08, 2003 this case was assigned to a Non-Senior Judge Pat Brian
to sit in a Court of Equal Jurisdiction in a Different Judicial District. A Notice of Status
Hearing was set on July 30, 2003 and scheduled on or about September 23, 2003.
However, between November 14th and 20th of 2003, Plaintiff Ronald Chilton
communicated with the Court via two (2) letters expressing that Plaintiffs' counsel James
Haskins had failed to submit key documents pertaining to the dates when Plaintiffs
discovered that Alan Young owed vacation pay award monies to the Plaintiffs from the
Pickering v. USX case.
On or about December 05, 2003 Judge Pat Brian issued a memorandum decision
denying Defendant's December 12, 2003 motion to dismiss (Exhibit IK page 5) which
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was treated as a summary judgment motion.
The scheduling order was completed by April 27, 2004. By June 08, 2004,
Plaintiff David Glazier hired Attorney Evan Schmutz as new Counsel. Some plaintiffs
remained with James Haskins and others signed on to be represented with new counsel
Evan Schmutz.
From June 08. 2004 until December 06, 2004 the case proceeded normally
aligning issues such as Initial Disclosures, motions for amened complaint, a simple
substitution of party, and finally, order granting leave to amened the complaint.
On April 06, 2005 Defendants filed a Joint Motion for Summary Judgment and on
June 02. 2005 Plaintiffs responded with Memorandums in Opposition. From July 01,
2005 until August 08, 2005 the parties filed numerous papers that were concluded in
Judge Pat Brian's September 22, 2005 Memorandum Decision when Judge Brian made an
error against Plaintiffs by altering and misinterpreting the meaning of the BLA contract.
In the BLA contract, which Judge Brian used as the key subject matter to make his final
ruling. Judge Brian erred in his memorandum when he referenced the BLA because he
replaced the word tenninate with the word discharge. Pat Brian also misquoted the BLA
pertaining to a reference of time for eligibility for vacation pay (Exhibit I, page 3, 9,10,
11), but the correct regulation can be found in BLA §12-A-l(b) (exhibit F).
On October 13, 2005 Defendants filed for Summary Judgment on all remaining
issues. This argument continued on paper until January 12, 2006 when Judge Pat Brian
filed a Memorandum Decision dismissing all remaining causes of action except for the
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Defendants' fiduciary duty as to how Defendants created and distributed the slush fund.
Judge Brian dismissed all of these other causes because they were related to the vacation
pay issue. The grounds for this dismissal were based on Defendant's false evidence and
the courts misinterpretations of the BLA.
On or about June 30, 2006 Plaintiffs' counsel Evan Schmutz withdrew from
representing three of the Plaintiffs an on or about that same date, Plaintiffs filed a motion
for reconsideration. Between July 6th and 14th of 2006 two abandoned Plaintiffs were
forced to file Notice of Entry of Appearance as Pro-Se. The third dismissed himself from
the case.
Between August 16, 2006 and April 16, 2007 both parties filed numerous
arguments over the motion to reconsider the current issues (including the vacation pa}7
issue), several applications and motions to extend time and/or to file over length
memorandums, a reply regarding Evan Schmutz withdraw of counsel, several letters, a
subpoena, and a request to submit for decision.
From May 07, 2007 and August 30, 2007 all clients of Evan Schmutz withdrew
from him and filed their Notices of Entry of Appearance as Pro Se.
At this point, the case had become so convoluted from switching counsel that
Plaintiffs did not have a complete documented history of the case, and the two former
counsel of Plaintiffs had not preserved a single judicial error nor violation of the Rules of
Evidence. Pro se Plaintiffs had no choice but to file a Motion for New Trial on or about
September 04. 2007. The events and circumstances of this lawsuit could be construed as
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exceptional circumstances under the exceptional circumstances doctrine.
September 10, 2007 Defendants objected to Motion for New trial and on
September 17, 2007 Plaintiffs objected to the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration
on the Vacation Pay Issue and Concurrent Motion for Court to Reverse and Correct its
Judicial Errors. Still, Plaintiffs have yet to be heard on the fiduciary breach claims even
though the Defendants1 have never provided any authenticated accounting records.
Additionally, the Plaintiffs demanded a jury trial on all issues so triable, but none has
been provided.
From September 17, 2007 until October 29, 2007 both parties filed arguments and
objections on all current dispositions, including 4 letters, and a submit for decision filed
October 2. 2007.
On or about March 15. 2008 the Court issued its Memorandum Decision and
Order denying Plaintiffs on all issues. The Court did not acknowledge, address, nor
provide hearing time on any Plaintiffs motions or issues, but simply denied Plaintiffs on
the sudden, unexpected, and erroneous ground of Statute of Limitations. This was an
unjust ruling fabricated as an escape hatch to avoid all the wrong doing and errors since
the onset of this lawsuit.
STAEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Early in this case, Plaintiffs were burdened with ineffective assistance of counsel,
but were unaware of the insufficiencies until they lost their representation for the second
time in June of 2006 leaving in disarray.
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This suit had been in four different courts, 3 different jurisdictions, handled by 3
different judges, two different attorneys for Plaintiffs, and then certain plaintiffs file as
pro se for the second time. All of these events are part and parcel of that which
constitutes the fundamental irregularities [Utah Civil Procedure Rule 59(a)(1)].
Plaintiffs were forced to subpoena documents from Alan Young, Attorney Evan
Schmutz and James Haskins (Exhibit M), but only received a partial history of the case.
That is when Plaintiffs became Pro Se litigants.
Plaintiffs counsel failed to object on pivotal issues. Plaintiffs counsel did not argue
against hearsay evidence pertaining to the Basic Labor Agreement, unauthenticated
accounting records, unsupported arguments pertaining to the Basic Labor Agreement, and
also failed to enter Plaintiffs evidence showing when the Plaintiffs discovered that the
Fraud had been committed. Furthermore. Plaintiffs counsel failed to include lost
increased pensions in the complaint under the Fraud cause of action. The issue of
Plaintiffs* lost increased pensions was discovered only after Plaintiffs became pro se in
2006 following their loss of counsel.
The Defendants inadmissible unauthenticated accounting records were self serving
records that were used for the purpose of convincing Plaintiffs that Defendant followed
Judge Jenkins' instructions in his Federal Ruling from Pickering v. USX, but no real,
transparent, verifiable, authenticated documents were provided to substantiate the
Defendant's unauthenticated accounting records. Plaintiffs counsel should have
demanded proof and objected to the lack thereof, but failed to preserve on completely
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erroneous interpretations of the Basic Labor agreement (BLA).
The BLA is contract between Plaintiffs and USX and issues such as vacation pay
were never in dispute; not in the previous case of Pickering v. USX and not legally in this
case. Instead of owning up to the fact that they breached their fiduciary duty to the
Plaintiffs the Defendants' would attempt to argue that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to
vacation pay. However, the problem with their approach is that the issues were never in
dispute in the Pickering case and the defendants are not a party to the BLA and do not
have the right to determine its meaning for themselves. Particularly while using hearsay
evidence and unsupported argument. Following that, the court then ignored Plaintiffs1
opposition to such objectionable procedures. If they could conjure up an expert witness,
one who could bring "prior course of dealings" as per UCC law, or some legal admissible
form of evidence to substantiate their defense, then OK, but they never provided
admissible evidence. These self serving interpretations included convincing the court to
go as far as redefining "terminate" into the words "effectively discharged" because they
could not substantiate actual "Discharge". The meanings are entirely different and most
certainly have entirely different effects and conclusions as they pertain to the Basic Labor
Agreement. The Defendants did this and more and they did it with no authority and no
proof; it was done completely by brute force of the court and Plaintiffs counsel stood idly
by without peeping a single "OBJECTION!" After pulling off this hijacking of the BLA,
the Plaintiffs were forced to suddenly become pro se Plaintiffs, but the case was in
shambles. The Plaintiffs still managed to notice the court and preserve with objections
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and motions. On or about September 2007, and as a matter of law, the Defendants were
boxed in by Plaintiffs1 motions and supporting memorandums. The courts only choice
was to reverse the errors or to provide the Plaintiffs with a new trial, but the lower court
had the unmitigated gull to dismiss this case in the face of its own errors even though it
had notice of those errors. The court initiated on its own accord an unjust ruling of statute
of limitations as an unfair escape route for the Defendants. In doing this, the court
overturned a prior ruling favoring the plaintiffs on this issue without providing any
opportunity for Plaintiffs to argue. It did this after four years of litigation because the
Plaintiffs finally defeated the Defendants on the material fact issues.
These deficiencies of Plaintiffs' counsel allowed the Defense to use faulty
evidence to mislead the District Court into artificial "new light" causing the illegal
overturning of the prior Federal Court ruling on the Pickering v. CTSXcase. Plaintiffs in
Pro Se preserved by objection and notified the Trial Court of errors (refer to Plaintiffs1
"Memorandum In Support of Motion for New Trial" filed September 4, 2007). The Court
did err in not correcting these issues.
Plaintiffs' twice deficient counsel followed by loss of counsel were exceptional
circumstances that hindered the process of flow of the case, and when counsel was
present, he was entirely ineffective on several key areas: 1. The complaint was missing a
cause of action pertaining to the lost pension issue. 2. Counsel failed to preserve with
objections, including the Defendants' obvious, unauthenticated, hand-drawn accounting
documents used to erroneously formulated lost wages using 0.53 instead of page 193 and
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231 of Judge Jenkins' Federal Ruling instructions to use 0.58 (Exhibit E). 3. Counsel
allowed the Defense, a non-party to the BLA, to illegally interpreted the BLA by twisting
its meaning in the attempt to equate ffterminate,, with "discharge" and then applying this
non-existent straw-man type argument, an argument with no genuine material facts and
no supporting substance; only fabrications. (Exhibit C, page 2, paragraph 2 ).
Following that foisting of false facts, the court also misquoted the eligibility
requirements by inserting a 6 month time stamp that simply did not exist. 4. Counsel
stood passively while Judge Pat Brian erroneously altered the language of the BLA
(Exhibit I, page 11, paragraph 2) and never objected to the fact that there was no party
to the BLA contract present to make such a legal claim and 5. Plaintiffs1 Counsel allowed
all these acts to go unobstructed by not objecting to the overturning of the Jenkins
Federal ruling when the Defense's misrepresented facts on vacation pay eligibility dates
and the courts misquotes of the BLA (Exhibit I pages 2, 3, 9, 10, 11). Standard of
Review speaks to these issues:
When a party fails to preserve an issue for appeal, we will address the issue
only if (1) the appellant establishes that the district court committed "plain
error," (2) "exceptional circumstances" exist, or (3) in some situations, if
the appellant raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to
preserve the issue. State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, f 18, 122 P.3d 566; State
v. Hansen, 2002 UT 114, ^ 21 n. 2, 61 P.3d 1062.
Specifically, The Defense unlawfully reinterpreted the Basic Labor Agreement
(BLA) and in this way, misled the Court when the Defense replaced a critical defining
word "terminate" with the word "discharge" that would then modify the terms of the
BLA. The Trial Court granted summary judgment to the Defendants based on this
14-50

deceptive argument. Additionally, a line was taken out of context from BLA §12-A-3
without including the entire paragraph. These word swaps and twists were the erroneous
new light the Defense used to cause the Court to illegally overturn a Federal Ruling on
vacation pay that was originally correct, was never in dispute in Pickering v. USX, and
the Defense never provided any expert witness testimony, no proof of prior course of
dealings, nor any admissible evidence of any kind. The Defense instead provided hearsay
and an unauthenticated piece of paper all of which the Plaintiffs completely crushed with
totally substantiated proof, but the lower court ignored that proof even though Plaintiffs
preserved and filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial. Pro Se Plaintiffs
preserved on these errors and tried to correct them. Refer to Plaintiffs1 "Memorandum In
Support of Motion for New Trial'1 (Exhibit A) and also, "Memorandum in Support of
Objection of Plaintiffs on Denial of Motion for Reconsideration on the Vacation Pay
Issue and Concurrent Motion for Court to Reverse and Correct its Judicial Errors
(Exhibit C).
When Plaintiffs became Pro Se in June 30, 2006 and began to gamer information
about how the case had been handled, they saw the errors of their former counsel, but
also discovered new evidence that justified court correction or a new trial. Once operating
as Pro Se litigants in 2006, Plaintiffs discovered: 1. The accrued 1987 vacation pay dates
had been misrepresented as accrued 1988 from the original Federal Ruling. To add insult
to injury, Pat Brian's also misquoted the BLA pertaining to time eligibility requirements
for vacation pay in his Memorandum Decision September 22, 2005 on page 1L line 3
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(Exhibit I) and see a copy of the BLA at BLA §12-Al(b). This caused Judge Pat Brian to
overturn the Federal ruling which caused Plaintiffs to lose the vacation pay earned in
1987 that would have become available in 1988. 2. When the vacation pay issue was
overturned, Pat Brain dismissed all the other causes of action that were related to the
vacation pay issue issue. 3. Lost wage calculations were formulated as 0.53 (Exhibit L),
but should have been 0.58 (Exhibit E page 75 and 90) and these errors were
unsupported, but were accompanied only by unauthenticated documents hand-drawn by
Defendants' with no genuine accounting records to substantiate them. The formula further
deviated from the Federal instruction by using 1984-1986 W2 forms to figure average
wages rather than the required 80 plus hour pay periods as awarded by Judge Jenkins in
Pickering v. USX (Exhibit E page 31 paragraph 2).
Plaintiffs did earn 1987 vacation pay that should have been paid in 1988 and is a
default asset not an award as per UCC 2-106(3) pertaining to surviving terms. If this issue
had been in dispute, it would have been raised in the Pickering v. USX trial. Plaintiffs'
objections and evidence was ignored by the lower court, but should have been reviewed
by way of Plaintiffsffs motion to reconsider and preservations.
Plaintiffsfs preserved on the court's errors because Pat Brian altered the BLA
contract terminology of "terminate" and "discharge", on the misquotes of time eligibility,
and also preserved when the Defendants were found having entered inadmissible
evidence in the form of unauthenticated documents. Plaintiffs also preserved on the use
of incorrect formulas for lost wage calculations, misrepresented vacation pay eligibility
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dates, and in offering hearsay evidence in the illegally redefining of the BLA contract.
Prior to dismissal, Plaintiffs filed Motion for New Trial, and notified the Court of
judicial errors, evidence violations, misrepresentation of facts, the concealment of actual
facts, and the erroneous application of mathematical formulas to calculate lost wages.
Additionally, pro se Plaintiffs were never given court time to argue the fiduciary breach
issues on pension and lost wage and were never given the jury trial they demanded. See
Plaintiffs1 September 4, 2007 Memorandum in Support of New Trial (page 2, item 4).
The Trial Court abused its discretion when it overturned the Federal Ruling on the
vacation pay issue and again when it failed to respond to Plaintiffs' objections and
motions to correct the errors and the evidence violations.
"Although the admission or exclusion of evidence is a question of law, we
review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude specific evidence for an
abuse of discretion." State v. Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, H 8, 76 P.3d 1165.
The May 8, 1995 Judge Jenkins's Federal ruling outlined the correct multiplier to
be 0.58 (7 months of a year) when calculating the Plaintiffs' lost wages. However, when
the Defendant Young calculated the wages he did not follow the Jenkins ruling, but
instead used an erroneous multiplier of 0.53. Defendants' accounting records were
unsupported by authenticated, transparent facts, but instead were self-created
unauthenticated accounting documents that should never had been admitted into the court
record without authenticated records to substantiate the Defendants' own documentation
and in doing so, violated evidence rules. Defendants miscalculated lost wages by using
the number .53 instead of the Judge Jenkins ruling that instructed a .58 calculation. In
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these same calculations, the Defendants used a 3 year average, but the Jenkins1 decision
demanded that only 80 plus hour pay periods be used. Plaintiffs objected and proved with
full documentation the corrected formula. The objections were ignored, but should have
been reviewed by way of Plaintiffs1 motion to reconsider.
Another big problem was that Counsel for the Plaintiffs failed to raise issues
pertaining to lost pension caused by Defendants' fiduciary breach and negligence. This
issue was never included in the complaint, but should have been, and now it manifests an
ongoing wrong doctrine. By the time the Plaintiffs were forced into Pro Se status, it was
all they could do just trying to recover the vacation pay issue and object to preserve
current issues. They didn't have time and resources to take backward steps in order to
recover from Counsel's earlier deficient representation and is all part and parcel of the
exceptional circumstances.
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim, raised for the first time on
appeal, presents a question of law. See State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). As stated earlier, to prevail on an ineffective
assistance claim. Defendant must show not only "that his trial counsel's
performance .. . fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," but
also that his counsel's deficient representation "prejudiced the outcome of
the trial." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
In the Trial Court's final ruling, Judge Roth dismissed on statute of limitations, but
Plaintiffs are not barred for the following reasons:
a) No party motioned for statute of limitations nor was any argument availed to
Plaintiffs on this issue.
b) In the Judge Brian's Memorandum Decision December 05, 2003 (Exhibit D),
Statute of Limitations had already been argued and won favoring Plaintiffs.

18-50

c) There were issues and judicial errors pending; Pro Se Plaintiffs preserved
(Exhibit A). The Trial Court was obligated to correct the errors once they were
raised by motion and objection.
d) The Defense used concealment to hide and misrepresent facts about the
vacation pay dates; objections were made, but Trial Court did not correct.
e) Plaintiffs did not become aware of the insufficiencies of their counsel's
mishandling of the case, nor of the Defense as a non-party to the BLA, illegally
redefining the BLA, and the falsifying and misrepresentation of evidence and
formulas on the vacation pay and lost wages issues until late 2006, well within
Statute of Limitations.
The district court abused its discretion when failing to review Plaintiffs' objections
and again when dismissing on grounds of Statute of limitations.
The accounting documents that were entered into the record by the Defense were
unauthenticated, inadmissible evidence. These same documents were used to falsely
substantiate the erroneous accounting information; Plaintiffs objected and motioned the
court to look at the problem, but the court failed to revisit the issue and Plaintiffs1 motions
were ignored.
There is also an issue of the Defendants1 double dipping contingency fees that is
exposed in his self-created unauthenticated documents and this issue was shown to the
court at the oral hearing on September 17, 2007, but has yet to be addressed by the trial
court although Plaintiffs raised this material issue by objection. In Judge Roth's
memorandum decision March 15, 2008, Roth restated the double dipping issue and said,
"Plaintiffs complained the contingency fee is too high", a misrepresentation of the facts.
The vacation pay issue of Judge Jenkins was illegally overturned by
misrepresentation of facts regarding vacation pay dates and controlling terms in the Basic
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Labor Agreement. Plaintiffs objected properly, but were ignored.
The lower court had no right to overturn the Jenkins ruling on the vacation pay
issue, but was misled when the Defendants concealed the true dates for which vacation
pay was accrued. The lower court should have corrected the error when Plaintiffs filed
objections and motions to correct the errors so they could recover their lost vacation pay.
The court made errors when it failed to revers upon notice by motions and
objections to Defendants hearsay in redefining the Basic Labor Agreement between the
Plaintiffs and USX Corp. Further, the Defendants are not a party to the BLA contract nor
were they authorities on the definition and terms of the BLA as it applies to the Plaintiffs.
As a defense to their fiduciary breach and fraud, Defendants' provided no expert
testimony or prior course of dealing and yet had the audacity to attack the Basic Labor
Agreement terms that are clearly protected by the UCC 2-106(3) and were never in
dispute at anytime in the Pickering v f/SXcase.
From the Defendants repeatedly using the word "discharged" in their their
documents to redefine the BLA, the court erred when it illegally changed the terminology
of the contract by replacing the word "terminate" with the word "discharge" (Exhibit I),
then made a ruling by way of these changes and in so doing, victimized the Plaintiffs
with a false and fabricated set of agreements that were not applicable to the Plaintiffs.
The following are attached:
a) Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trail (Exhibit A from
the docketing statement).
b) Judge Roth's March 15, 2008 final Memorandum Decision and Order
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(Defendants' Third Summary Judgment Motion and Other Pending Motions)
(Exhibit B from the docketing statement)
c) Memorandum in Support of Objection of Plaintiffs on Denial of Motion for
Reconsideration on the Vacation Pay Issue and Concurrent Motion for Court to
Reverse and Correct its Judicial Errors.
d) Memorandum Decision of Judge Pat Brian issued December 5, 2003.
e) Certain pages of Judge Jenkins* Ruling on Vacation Pay Eligibility issued May
5, 1995.
fi Certain pages of the Basic Labor Agreement: BLA §12-A-l(b) (Vac Pa\
Ehgibiht} I BLA §12-A-3 (Forfeit Language), BLA §8-A and X-B (Suspension
and Discharge)
g) Chilton Letters showing SOL clock start on discovery
h) Memorandum Decision of Pat Brian issued January 12. 2006.
i) Memorandum Decision of Pat Brian dated September 22, 2005.
j) Memorandum in Support of Certain Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of
the Courts First Entry of Summary Judgment (Vacation Pay Issue) and
Opposition to the Defendants' Joint Motions to Strike the Motions for
Reconsideration of Chilton and Glacier, November 6, 2006.
k) Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion foi
Reconsideration.
I) IJnauthenticated documents submitted by the Defendants
m) Subpoenas issued to Allen Young, Evan Schmutz, James Ha skins
nj Evan Schmutz withdrawal as counsel
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Dismissing this lawsuit on th grounds of statute of limitations is not appropriate,
Deming Plaintiffs their surviving contract terms in the Basic Labor Agreement has
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been based entirely on false premises. The Defendants have never provided a single shred
of admissible evidence in their defense. The pro se Plaintiffs have proven their claims.
The Plaintiffs have proven their claims with facts, evidence, and supporting laws and
have identified under no uncertain terms the misrepresentations of the Defense that were
used to confuse and mislead the court for the purposes of twisting the truth.
For the Plaintiffs lawsuit to be dismissed on statute of limitations after all the time
invested and at the moment the Defendants were defeated suggests that this result has
always been a foregone conclusion in the mind of Mr. Roth. That the lower court, under
Judge Roth, had never intended on providing Plaintiffs a trial let alone a fair one.
Plaintiffs did the right thing by sending the court the letters indicating that they
were concerned about the adequacy of their counsel early in the lawsuit because it
achieved two important things: (1) it got the documentation filed in the record and (2) it
substantiates that the Plaintiffs are not simply blaming their counsel last minute, but that
they saw the problem early on in this lawsuit.
One fact is clear, the fact that Plaintiffs counsel was critically deficient in the most
important areas and moments of this lawsuit. There would be a different result if counsel
had performed even the most elementary of tools of trial litigation. Instead, they didnft
even perform a single objection to confront some of the most obvious and blatant
violations of the rules of evidence, let alone try to expose the Defenses erroneous and
even fictitious arguments.
The court should have reversed and corrected the vacation pay issue. The court
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should not have given Defendants' summary judgment on lost wages and vacation pay,
but should have reversed the summary judgment when noticed of the errors. The court
should have recognized that Plaintiffs were not getting a fair trial and were prejudiced by
losing council twice and these events did affect the outcome of the trial.
ARGUMENT
I.
PLAINTIFFS COUNSEL IS DEFECIENT AND FAILES TO
PRESERVE AGAINST DEFENDANTS' FICTICIOUS
ARGUMENTS, UNAUTHENTICATED DOCUMENTS, HEARSAY,
AND ILLEGALY REDEFING THE BLA (BASIC LABOR
AGREEMENT).
Plaintiffs argue that their counsel was ineffective in failing to object to Defendant's
hand written, unauthenticated accounting record. The Defendant's accounting record
violates evidence rules and fails to substantiate any true paper trail nor is the record
transparent or auditable in any way, shape, or form.
After the Plaintiffs lost their counsel the second time and became pro se plaintiffs
in mid 2006, the Plaintiffs found these discrepancies and objected with motions to initiate
a correction. Plaintiffs also filed a subpoena to demand Defendant Alan Young to provide
a transparent accounting record of the source and distribution of Pickering v. USX award
monies, but the Defendant never provided a true, correct, authenticated, accounting
record of any kind. Not even so much as a deposit slip. Plaintiffs' counsel was completely
ineffective in properly fighting this lawsuit and made no effort to stop inadmissible
evidence from entering the record.
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"An effective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal presents a
question of \zm." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, fl 6, 89 P.3d 162. To establish ineffective
assistance of counsel, Plaintiffs must demonstrate both that "counsel's performance was
deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment,"
and that " counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial."State v. Litherland, 2000 UT
76, If 19, 12 P.3d 92 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)).
To establish the first prong of the Stricklandtest, Plaintiffs must "rebut the strong
presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered
sound trial strategy. "Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 1} 19 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). If a court can conceive of a tactical basis for counsels actions, then counsel is
not deficient under the first Stricklandprong. See State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, U 11,4
P.3d 778 (first prong of Strickland not satisfied because conceivable that counsel's
conduct resulted from deliberate and tactical choice); State v. Holbert, 2002 UT App 426,
11 58, 61 P.3d 291 (same). To establish the second prong, Plaintiff must show prejudice,
that is, they "must show . . . a reasonable probability exists that but for the deficient
conduct Plaintiffs would have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial." Clark, 2004
UT 25, U 6 (citing State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996)); Strickland 466 U.S. at
687.
A.

Here, Plaintiffs can show deficient performance and prejudice. Plaintiffs

can show deficient performance because a conceivable tactical basis did not exist for
counsel having not objecting to unauthenticated, hand written, accounting records.
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Because the Defendant's unauthenticated accounting record is not transparent, is not
auditable, and does not show the source and distribution of Pickering v. USX award
monies nor does the Defendant's accounting record show a auditable and transparent use
the legal fees that were paid by Plaintiffs, there is no reasonable legal tactic or strategy
that could benefit Plaintiffs in the outcome of this lawsuit by Plaintiffs counsel not
opposing and objecting to Defendant's unauthenticated, handwritten, accounting record
(Exhibit L). Conversely, by not objecting to the Defendant's self serving handwritten
records, the court acted on the Defendant's fictitious records as if they were real and
accurate and therefore. Plaintiffs were denied a fair trial. Plaintiffs counsel, Evan
Schmutz failed to request documents, or file a subpoena for Defendants' true accounting
records nor did Plaintiffs' counsel object to the Defendant's use of unauthenticated
handwritten accounting records.
Plaintiffs can show prejudice because the conduct of the Plaintiffs' counsel
unquestionably prejudiced the outcome of this trial on this issue. If counsel had
performed his job to at least a normal standard, the outcome would most certainly have
been different. Furthermore, because the Defense never produced authenticated
documents, Plaintiffs counsel should have moved for summary judgment for the
Plaintiffs, but he did not. From the behavior of the Plaintiffs counsel, one could conclude
that counsel was working against his client in support of the opposing side.
B.

Here, Plaintiffs can again show deficient performance and prejudice.

Plaintiffs can show deficient performance because a conceivable tactical basis did not

25-50

exist for counsel's not objecting to the Defendant's redefining of the meaning of the BLA
pertaining to Plaintiffs vacation pay eligibility. The Plaintiffs counsel was deficient when
he failed to object to several legal errors pertaining to Defendant's raising and altering of
the meaning to the BLA contract with USX, and in this failure, the Plaintiffs were
prejudiced because there absolutely is a different outcome of this case that would have
resulted. Plaintiffs Counsel failed to oppose the Defendant's committing of the following
legal errors when they redefined and misinterpreted the Basic Labor Agreement (BLA):
1. Alan Young raised a non-existent "straw-man" argument that fictitiously placed
him in the position of Defendant in the Pickering v. USX case and then, with erroneous
and false premises, proceeded to argue away Plaintiffs rights by redefining and
misrepresenting the terms of the BLA. Pickering v. USXis a closed case where Plaintiffs
had already been given the accrued 1987 vacation pay by default and that issue was never
in dispute between the parties in Pickering v. USX. Vacation pay is a surviving right of the
contract (UCC 2-106(3)) and that is why it was never in dispute in the Pickering v. USX
case. The only mention of vacation pay in Pickering v. USX was the final Federal Court
ruling outlining everything Plaintiffs will be awarded (Exhibit E page 193). However, in
this lawsuit, Defendant Alan Young created a fictitious vacation pay dispute between
himself and Plaintiffs as a defense against his fiduciary breach for not paying vacation
pay monies he owed to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs counsel, Evan Schmutz never objected to this
error in law (Utah Civil Procedure Rule 59(a)(6) "Insufficiency of the evidence" and
Rule 59(a)(7) "Error in Law").
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2. After Alan Young tricked the court into allowing his fictitious argument to
ensue with no opposition from Plaintiffs' counsel, he then created another false and
fictitious argument about the vacation pay dates claiming that the Plaintiffs were not
entitled to accrued 1988 vacation pay, which would be true, but is moot since it was
accrued 1987 vacation to be paid in 1988, but again, this is not a legitimate argument
because vacation pay had not been in dispute, was a closed Federal case, was a done deal
by default of Pickering v. USX, is protected by UCC 2-106(3), and is therefore, again
"Error in Law" let alone all the evidence rules that were violated. Yet, Plaintiffs counsel
Evan Schmutz never objected and so the court allowed Alan Young to win on Summary
Judgment on these erroneous issues with no opposition from Plaintiffs Counsel Evan
Schmutz. Therefore and under no uncertain terms, this was deficient performance of
counsel and prejudiced the outcome of the case.
3. Alan Young created yet again another false argument over non-issues from
Pickering v. USX and claimed that the Plaintiffs were "discharged" when in fact, the}7
were terminated (something entirely different from being discharge). When terminated,
there are surviving terms such as vacation pay (UCC §2-106 (3)), but when discharged,
there are no surviving benefits except vested pensions. In this fabrication, Alan Young
attempts to redefine the BLA (Basic Labor Agreement) by erroneously claiming Plaintiffs
were discharged (an action against individual criminal behavior) from USX instead of
terminated (a company caused job loss) as a way to avoid his fiduciary breach. This
manipulation and reinterpretation of the BLA is not only completely erroneous, it is
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illegal because there was no dispute between the BLA parties. Alan Young is not a party
to the BLA and he cannot pretend to be one as a defense to fiduciary breach. Alan Young
did this as a distraction to his fiduciary breach for not paying Plaintiffs the vacation
monies owed to them. The lower court favored Defendant's in a summary judgment
because of no opposition from Plaintiffs Counsel. The Defendants arguments were
without merit and were false and because they went unopposed by Plaintiffs counsel, did
prejudice the outcome of the case. If Defendants had been forced to argue and prove their
defense, the outcome of the case would be different, but their argument, while
unsupported in law, went unopposed because of deficient counsel. Plaintiffs' counsel did
not defend these errors nor object in any way, but stood passively while Defendants
bamboozled the court and legal process. In the memorandum decisions of both
September 27, 2005 and also January 12, 2006, Judge Pat Brian included the words
"effectively discharged" when ruling against the Plaintiffs. The court had no authority to
modify the meaning a the BLA agreement by adding words "effectively discharged". For
the lower court to try a case over terms of the BLA, the court would need to have a
dispute between the parties to the BLA itself or, would need a true form of evidence
defining the terms of the BLA such as a expert witness or a BLA historical prior course of
dealing to support the ruling and yet Plaintiffs counsel again stood passively and failed to
object. The result of counsel's deficiencies prejudiced the Plaintiffs because a corrected
interpretation of the BLA would yield a different result. Judge Brian also misquoted the
BLA §12-A-l-b on page 11 of his September 27, 2005 memorandum decision pertaining
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to a 6 months time element, but Plaintiffs were never allowed to correct this error on
account of their counsel Evan Schmutz failing again to argue the issue and object to the
Judgefs erroneous interpretation.
4. Defendants argued the terms of the BLA with no proof, no authorities, no
experts or direct party testimony, and no admissible conclusive documents, but instead
used nothing more than hearsay; all oral or written interpretations of the BLA and claims
by the defense were HEARSAY and are inadmissible (Utah Rule 803). Plaintiffs counsel
again stood passively, did not object to any evidence violations, and allowed the
Defendants to file an unopposed summary judgment motion. The Plaintiffs counsel never
requested nor demanded a history of the BLA and its prior course of dealings nor did
Defendants provide any. Any of the common legal practices, if utilized by the Plaintiffs
counsel could have yielded a different outcome in the case and therefore, shows both
deficiencies of counsel and that those deficiencies prejudiced the Plaintiffs in this case.
C.

Plaintiffsffs counsel again failed to act in the interest of Plaintiffs when the

Defendants used incorrect formula to calculate lost wages as per the instructions of the
Federal court ruling in Pickering v USX. Defendants used 0.53 in place of 0.58 and the
Defense counsel said nothing to raise the issue and protect the interest of the Plaintiffs.
This most certainly shows a different outcome would have resulted and did prejudice the
Plaintiffs.
Subsequent arguments pertaining to vacation pay and lost wages will show that
there is no way this case could have been lost but for the deep deficiencies of counsel
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because the evidence violations and and the facts surrounding vacation pay and lost
wages are so blatantly obvious and self evident that no counsel even on the most basic
level should have not managed the case differently.
ARGUMENT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRS WHEN IT DENIES PLAINTIFFS1
CONTRACTUAL SURVIVING RIGHTS PERTAINING TO THE BASIC
LABOR AGREEMENT BASED ON ERRONEOUS INFORMATION,
THE LOWER COURT COMMITS REVERSABLE ERROR WHEN
OVERTURNING THE PRIOR FEDERAL COURT RULING OF JUDGE
JENKINS.
The Vacation Pay issues that were erroneously ruled upon by way of Defendants
otherwise inadmissible evidence are:
a. Confusion over the dates of 1987 and 1988 for eligibility.
b. Confusion over meaning of Terminated and Discharged.
We will show the court that Plaintiffs do qualify for vacation pay and in so doing,
show the court where and how the Defendants have mislead the lower court into judicial
error on this issue. We will also show that the original Federal ruling of Judge Jenkins
was correct and that the lower court should not have overturned the ruling, but should
have corrected the error as soon as Plaintiffs brought forth the evidence, facts, and laws in
support of as much.
We will also show that law and argument, including some argument from the
Defense, actually supports Plaintiffs position.
Although Plaintiffs' lower court memorandums in support of motion for
reconsideration and new trial along with our objections to the Defense and lower court's
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errors establishes in solid terms the legal foundation on these issues. We will attempt to
create here an even more contrasting conclusion favoring Plaintiffs.
The BLA sections we will look at are: 12-A-l (Eligibility) and 12-A-3
(Forfeiture).
The first order of business in clearing up the Vacation Pay issue is to show how the
Defense misconstrued the accrued 1987 vacation pay dates. Following that, we will show
how the Defense then attempted to disqualify Plaintiffs for vacation pay by misconstruing
the effects of BLA terms regarding "Termination" versus "Discharge and their attempt to
equate the terms as having the same meaning.
Factl: Plaintiffs earned an accrued 1987 vacation pay. Accrued vacation pay is
normally paid in the following year. Therefore, the 1987 accrued vacation pay would be
paid out n 1988. However, the 1988 date is irrelevant because the only thing that matters
is that Plaintiffs are owed their accrued 1987 vacation pay which is now overdue. That's
the simple truth regarding these dates.
Fact 2: Because the 1987 vacation pay would have been paid in 1988, the Defense
has played into these dates and confused the court into thinking it is 1988 vacation pay
that the Plaintiffs are seeking, but they are not. They are seeking 1987 vacation pay; that's
all!
The Defense spoke incorrectly about these dates in their arguments so many times
that in so doing, convinced the court that Plaintiffs did not qualify for 1987 vacation.
They did this by referring to 1987 vacation pay that would have been paid in 1988 as
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though it were accrued 1988 vacation which of course, the steelworkers did not accrue.
Example for clarification: If the workers had accrued 1988 vacation pay, it would
be scheduled to be paid in 1989. However, we are not talking about accrued 1988
vacation pay to be paid in 1989. What we are talking about is accrued 1987 vacation pay
that would have been scheduled to be paid in 1988 (the following year from the year of
accrual). In fact, the 1987 vacation pay could, in some instances, be collected while in
1987, but usually workers wait for the following year.
To say that plaintiffs did not qualify for 1988 vacation pay would be a true
statement, but to say that they did not qualify to be paid their 1987 vacation pay in the
year of 1988 would be a false statement.
It was this simple area where the meaning of these dates was mixed up and
misconstrued. Look at Defendants argument in (Exhibit K, page 5), the Defenses Motion
to Strike Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration. Read lines 1 through 11 to see how they
worded their statements to see the problem they caused. You will also notice that they
were able to get the original and correct Judge Jenkins Federal Court ruling overturned
based on their erroneous and misconstrued argument. It is very sad and frustrating that
the Plaintiffs have had to suffer so much litigation just trying to solve this simple issue,
but the fact that Plaintiffs were forced to argue these issues at this point and time in this
lawsuit substantiates their "deficiencies of counsel" claim found in other parts of this
brief to show that Plaintiffs are entitle to this appeal.
On page 8 of Exhibit K, lines 10 through 15 very clearly shows how the court was
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confused on this Vacation Pay date issue and how the Defense misled the court. Defense
counsel Mr. Burbidge states in quoting Judge Jenkins's Federal Court ruling,
"Judge Brian correctly ruled that the steelworker were only entitled to 1988
vacation pay if they were still employed as of January 1, 1988. Because
Judge Jenkins had ruled that all of the steelworker were terminated when
USX sold the Geneva steel plant to Basic Minerals and Technologies, Inc.
effective August 31, 1987, the steelworkers were not entitled to 1988
vacation pay."
So while Pat Brian's ruling was correct, his application was wrong because
qualification for 1988 vacation pay is a moot point. No Plaintiffs are seeking 1988
vacation pay, but are seeking 1987 vacation pay. However, in reading the above from
Judge Brian's ruling, Judge Brian has also establish the fact that Plaintiffs were entitled to
1987 benefits and they were "terminated", not "discharged. Therefore, favoring Plaintiffs
on the Vacation Pay issue, and possibly other issues pertaining to the steelworkers
surviving benefits in the year of 1987 is a matter of Summary Judgment favoring the
Plaintiffs as admitted by Defense counsel's own document. Exhibit K. page 8.
This Exhibit K also authentically documents other facts at issue. First, it shows
that the original Jenkins (the Federal Ruling) was overturned and, when looking at other
upcoming facts, it will show that it was overturned in judicial error. For now, look at
Exhibit K, page 2 in the Title/Description of the document. This document title
substantiates that Plaintiffs did try to correct this issue since Exhibit K is an opposing
motion against Plaintiffs attempt to get reconsideration on this issue.
The next step in this tour of the destruction of Plaintiffs rights is to to be sure that
Jenkins did give Plaintiffs 1987 vacation pay to be paid in 1998. Looking again at
33-50

Exhibit K on page 5, look at lines 7 and 8 where it discusses the Geneva plant sales date
as being August 31, 1987. This is the key to 1987 Vacation Pay qualification to be paid in
1988. Although Exhibit K substantiates this date on its own by way of the page 5
discussion, it is good to see it for ourselves from the Judges pen. Look at Exhibit E page
193 (identified at the bottom of the page), paragraph 289, at the 3rd line in that
paragraph. Here we can see that Jenkins did in fact include vacation pay. However, let us
also see where the 1987 vacation pay is fully substantiated. Exhibit E on the West Law
page identified as page 6, 1st paragraph under Idling (" Active" and "Management)
Plaintiffs shows why Jenkins awarded all benefits for which Plaintiffs would qualify
under the terms of the August 31, 1987 sale of the Geneva Plant. This shows us that the
original Jenkins ruling calculated employee benefits as if the plant had remained opened
until August 31, 1987 and vacation pay for 1987 is included in those benefits as has
already been shown.
Another problem that was caused by the Defensed was when they took out of
context from the "Forfeiture Language" of the Basic Labor Agreement (BLA). To see
where the Defense misled the court in this way, return to Exhibit K, page 5, lines 10 and
11. Here we see that Defense counsel Mr. Burbidge states,
ff

. . . a steel worker was not entitled to vacation pay in 1988 if he or she was
discharged prior to January 1, 1988."
The above quote from the Defense counsel's memorandum contains two errors.
The first is the repeated misstatement pertaining to 1988 vacation pay. Again, 1988 is
moot and is irrelevant in this lawsuit. Plaintiffs are seeking their 1987 vacation pay, not
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1988. Second, the Plaintiffs were never "discharged" and as we shall see, this became
another area where the Defense misguided the court into an erroneous conclusion which
led to the denial of Plaintiffs rights.
DISCHARGE VERSUS TERMINATE
In the Defense counsel's misrepresentation of terminate versus discharge, the
defense has equated the two terms as if they are the same when in fact they are not. The
intention of the Defendants is to escape their malfeasance buy confusing the court on this
issue. The Defense has caused the lower to make a judicial error by claiming the effects
of discharge are equal to terminate. This area of logic is one in which courts should be
very careful to examine else cause substantial injustice.
Fact 1: Discharge is caused by an act of an employee.
Fact 2: Termination is caused by an act of the company.
Exhibit E (the Federal court ruling) on the West Law page identified as page 6,
1st paragraph under Idling ("Active" and "Management) Plaintiffs on the 14th
through 20th lines in that paragraph shows that Judge Jenkins stated.
" . . . they had remained active employees who were terminated when
Geneva was sold to BM&T in August of 1987."
This shows under no uncertain terms that the Plaintiffs were "terminated1', but were NOT
"discharge". Reading further, Jenkins also states,
"the "idling" Plaintiffs1 individual remedies must be determined with
reference to the seven-month "idling" period from February 1, 1987
through August 31, 1987.
This sets up the understanding as to why the Plaintiffs did qualify for all the 1987
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benefits that survive as a matter of law. This is not limited to the BLA, but is a very
common in most industries, including government employees. When terminated, all
accrued benefits can still be collected and is the surviving rights of a contract UCC §2106(3).
UCC §2-106(3) "Termination" occurs when either party pursuant to a
power created by agreement or law puts an end to the contract otherwise
than for its breach. On "termination" all obligations which are still
executory on both sides are discharged but any right based on prior breach
or performance survives.
As can be seen in the UCC, executory obligations get "discharged", but this does
not refer to employees. This UCC also shows us that on "termination", rights based on
"prior performance" survives. This would apply to vacation pay and other benefits. A
very important showing in this UCC is that "discharge" IS NOT equated to "terminate".
Hence, the bad case law. It is a fact and a maxim that anything similar IS NOT the same.
Discharge and terminate may have some similarities, but they are absolutely not the
same. However, their differences are contrasting enough that they should be obvious and
should not be confused with one another.
In the Basic Labor Agreement, the differences between discharge and terminate are
very clear. When discharged, all benefits other than vested pensions are lost. Exhibit F,
page 50 and 51 of the 1987 BLA in BLA §8-A and BLA §8-B defines Discharge and no
where in this section is the word "terminate".
Plaintiffs were never discharge. Not at any time were they ever discharge from
USX. The Federal ruling on this issue is clear. The only reason the terminate and
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discharge comparison came into question in this lawsuit of Chilton v. Young is because of
the Defendants' malfeasance when they were counsel in the Pickering v. USXcase. They
now attempt to escape their wrong doing by raising this fabricated, erroneous, straw-man
type discharge/terminate argument and then foisting it onto the Plaintiffs.
The argument pertaining to whether Plaintiffs were discharge or terminated is
another sad and frustrating area because Plaintiffs have again been forced to argue an
issue that should otherwise be totally obvious but for the Defendant's misrepresentation
of the "terminate" versus "discharge" issue. Additionally, the fact that Plaintiffs have
noticed the court, preserved on these errors, and are trying to recover from the erroneous
lower court conclusion that Plaintiffs were "discharge", again substantiates the
deficiencies of Plaintiffs original counsel and the justification for this appeal.
There is some bad case law that does equate an employee's being discharged to be
the same as being terminated. This case law should be limited in use or perhaps
overturned, but at the very least, it should not be allowed to penetrate a well established
contract between a company and over 100,000 employees when the contract is already
very well established as to its meaning. Additionally, this case law should only be viewed
from a purely logical point of view. For example, if we were to assume that discharge is
the same as terminate, must we then say that terminate is the same as discharge? No! If
discharge triggered termination (which it can't under the BLA nor under UCC §2-106(3)),
it would not be correct to say termination also will triggered discharge. Again, even if the
court were to determine that an employee who is "discharged" is also "effectively

37-50

terminated", it would still be incorrect to say an employee who is "terminated" is also
"effectively discharge". The one is not the other. It does work in reverse even if the court
could get it to work in one direction. It is not a two way logical conclusion. There are too
many factors. However, the issue is moot anyway because as a matter of law, they are not
the same. The logic doesn't work. Therefore, terminate cannot be the same as discharge
even if one were to find that discharge is the same as terminate. Besides, by inserting the
word, "effectively" the contract has been tampered with. Their is no "effectively
discharged". You either are or you are not discharged. The steelworkers were not
discharged. For the lower court to dismiss this cause of action using the words,
"effectively discharged" is a form of peremptory discharge with cannot be done according
to the BLA. To discharge a steelworker as per the BLA, it requires management
involvement and is based on a conclusion employee conduct.
According to the BLA §8-B, to be discharged, the following rules apply:
1. Cannot be peremptorily discharged
2. Management must conclude the justification of suspension or discharge based
on employee conduct.
3. A copy of the discharge notice must shall be promptly furnished to such
employee's grievance committee.
None of the above processes have taken place and therefore, there is no possible
way the steelworkers could be deemed to have been discharge nor "effectively
discharged". All of these vacation pay issues were generated by the Defense to distort the
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truth about the meaning of the BLA and to foist false argument against the Plaintiffs, it's
outrageous!
ARGUMENT III
DEFENDANTS FAILED TO CORRECTLY CALCULATE LOST WAGES AS
OUTLINED IN THE FEDERAL COURTS INSTRUCTION. THE LOWER COURT
MADE ERRORS WHEN IT DISMISSED THE LOST WAGES ISSUE IN THE FACE
OF PLAINTIFFS1 MOTIONS TO RECONSIDER AND OBJECTIONS. A HEARING
ON THE LOST WAGES ISSUE HAS NEVER BEEN PROVIDED.
Because this issue is addressed in the preceding pages, we will attempt to stick to
simple facts and references to evidence.
The following ,fLost Wages" issue is brought to this court because of the following
reasons: (1) The Plaintiffs counsel of HJS failed to argue the issue which speaks to
previous argument in this brief pertaining to Deficiencies of Counsel. (2) Defendants
used the wrong formula to calculate wages and this resulted in substantial losses to
Plaintiffs. (3) Plaintiffs preserved and raised this issue to the lower court, but were
ignored. Plaintiffs were not given so much as a hearing.
Fact 1: Allen Young used a 0.53 multiplier instead of a 0.58 multiplier when
calculating wages.
Fact 2: Allen Young used years 1984 through 1986 to calculate average wages.
Exhibit L, item "Hearing Worksheet for Idling Plaintiffs" shows that Allen Young
did use 0.53 as the multiplier. However, Young should have used 0.58. Exhibit E, page
75 and page 89 shows the correct multiplier of 0.58 as per Federal court ruling.
Exhibit L. item "Hearing Worksheet for Idling Plaintiffs" shows that Defendant
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Young did use 1984 through 1986 for calculating average wages. However, Allen Young
should have used back pay based upon income earned during pay periods in which a
plaintiff worked 80 or more hours. Exhibit E, page 31, paragraph 2 outlines the proper
formula for averaging wages.
All these facts were never argued by Plaintiffs counsel further substantiating
deficiencies of counsel argument earlier in this brief. When Plaintiffs raised these
material issues by way of Motions for Reconsideration and Objections, the lower court
ignored Plaintiffs.
ARGUMENT IV
PLAINTIFFS COUNSEL FAILES TO INCLUDE LOST INCREASED PENSIONS AS
PART OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.
Lost Pensions is part of the Defendants fiduciary breach that Plaintiffs earlier
counsel failed to include in the complaint. This again speaks to the deficiencies of
counsel issue.
ARGUMENT V
THE LOWER COURT COMMITS A GROSSLY UNJUST ERROR
WHEN DISMISSING ON STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND RAISES
ISSUES OF CONSIPRACY AGAINST PLAINTIFFS
Judge Roth should have waved his right to Statute of Limitations (hereafter
referred to as SOL) for allowing this case to go on for several years. In other words, there
should be a SOL for using SOL when a law case has already ensued for eight (8) years.
Roth came into this case in 2004, and now at the end of 2008, he raises SOL. This is
unjust for several reasons.
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SOL was defeated when Plaintiffs showed Judge Pat Brian in December 2003 that
no Plaintiff knew that the Defendants had deceived them until they sat in the court
hearing of Chamberlain v. Young of 2001 where Thomas Chamberlain was suing Alan
Young for a finders fee. They had a witness on the stand by the name of Scott Daniels, a
retired judge who stated after he read Judge Jenkins1 ruling that Alan Young owed all of
the Plaintiffs vacation pay. That's when the Plaintiffs found out that they were owed
vacation pay. No Plaintiff knew anything about vacation pay because Defendant Allan
Young never at any time explained what the pay was for; just that it was your losses as he
calculated them. Plaintiffs did not know what he calculated. Plaintiffs had never seen a
ruling from Judge Jenkins. Plaintiffs did not know what the calculation figures from the
Jenkins ruling were nor how they told Alan Young to use them. At that time they did not
know about the calculations, but after their attorney Evan Schmutz withdrew from the
case, they found out and have brought all of this forth and put it in front of Judge Roth,
but Judge Roth has turned a blind eye to everything pro se Plaintiffs have given him.
This instant law case was filed in 2001, approximately 30 days after Plaintiffs
heard Judge Scott Daniels say on the witness stand that Alan Young owed Plaintiffs
vacation pay that was accrued in 1987 to be paid in 1988.
Because of the promise that Alan Young made to Plaintiffs that the settlement was
100% plus more of Judge Jenkins1 ruling, no Plaintiff had any reason to go looking for
anything if it was 100% plus more of Judge Jenkins ruling that they were entitled to
receive, but no Plaintiff knew what Judge Jenkins had ruled except the Defendant
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attorneys.
At that time, Plaintiffs counsel James Haskins did not file these facts into the court
record that would show the court when the Plaintiffs made this discovery of new
evidence of Defendant Alan Young owing Plaintiffs money. Plaintiffs were expecting
their counsel James Haskins to file this information into the court, but he did not file the
information as instructed. This was pertaining to the SOL and was the purpose for filing
the facts of discovery of new evidence. Allan Young had filed to have the case dismissed
on the grounds of SOL, but Defendant was denied that motion because Ron Chilton had
sent a letter, around his attorney, to Judge Pat Brian telling him that Plaintiffs attorney
had not included the dates when they found out that they were owed vacation pay which
was in the trial between Allan Young and Tom Chamberlain in May of 2001.
It can be construed that the attorneys knew that Plaintiffs did not understand that
Plaintiffs were owed money for vacation pay because it was never disclosed to the
Plaintiffs.
What Judge Roth is trying to do now is ignore the fact that if he were going to
dismiss this case on SOL he should have attempted to dismiss it at the beginning, not
after four years litigation under Roth, and four years before that under Judge Pat Brian.
Isn't there an SOL for when the judge can decide an SOL dismissal? There should be! No
party raised the issue; Roth brought SOL in on his own accord. But even so, SOL had
already been argued and won favoring Plaintiffs with Judge Pat Brain at the onset of this
lawsuit. Judge Brain believed the Plaintiffs were telling the truth when the events took
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place and Brain has the discretion to make that decision. The SOL doesn't have a strong
enough ground to stand on against the gravity of the material facts of this case, if this
case is to be construed so to do substantial justice, which the law commands. Because (1)
Plaintiffs already won SOL in Judge Pat Brian's December 5, 2003 decision (2) The court
allowed the case to go for eight years, (four of which was with Judge Roth) before Roth
decided to steal the case from the Plaintiffs with SOL. (3) Roth didn't hand out this unjust
SOL dismissal until Plaintiffs defeated the Defendants at the last minute as a matter of
law by providing clear, concise, articulate, accurate, and legally supported argument in
Plaintiffs memorandums and objections. (4) The court is using the law to defeat the law
(5) The court must weigh the test between the gravity of the 184 innocent victim
Plaintiffs and their families that have been affected by the Defendants Misfeasance versus
the very small group of guilty victimizing Defendant attorneys who have done nothing
but distort the truth of the truth and who should have been penalized for their deceit in
this lawsuit. (6) Exceptional circumstances come into play (7) Fraudulent concealment
that Defendants knew that Plaintiffs did not know they were owed money. (8) Ongoing
Wrong Doctrine (9) UCC 2-106(3) surviving rights of a contract.
Defendants knew that the Plaintiffs were owed money and they knew that the
Plaintiffs did not know that they were owed money. Defendants knew that the Plaintiffs
were relying entirely on the information provided to them by counsel. After all, that is
why the Plaintiffs hired counsel, to protect their interest no different from when a home
buyer hires a title company to be certain the house is clear of any liens or other
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encumbrances. In this lawsuit, Alan Young and associates was the Title company the
Plaintiffs hired to make sure they would get all they were entitled to receive. Just as when
a Title company must be responsible for their mistakes (title insurance), the Defendants
must be responsible for their mistakes. It is exactly the same in comparison. Because the
Plaintiffs hired Allan Young to determine what is the result of the USX plant closing
down as it pertains to their rights and interests. How would this event effect the Plaintiffs
situation? The Plaintiffs had no knowledge of these things. They relied entirely on their
Counsel for exactly this purpose. Just like in the example with the Title company
Plaintiffs hired the attorneys to determine the issues and if the attorneys did not do the job
correctly, then it is the attorneys that must bare the costs of their mistakes, just as does a
title company. See Exhibit D and pay attention to page 4 and 5 where the case law was
found to deny Defendant's motion to dismiss and treated that motion as summary
judgment favoring Plaintiffs.
It wasn't the Plaintiffs job to interpret the laws and determine the rights of the
Plaintiffs when their company goes out of business; Plaintiffs hired the attorneys to
interpret the laws so that when the attorneys came to the Plaintiffs and gave them the
conclusion of the attorneys determination, Plaintiffs had a right to rely on the information
and believe that the Plaintiffs counsel made the correct determination and were being told
the truth. The Plaintiffs trusted what they were told by their counsel; they had no reason
not to trust counsel at that time. When Plaintiffs were told by their counsel the results,
Plaintiffs thought that was it, they hired an attorney who found out what the rights of the
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Plaintiffs were and what the Plaintiffs were entitled to receive and that was it. That was
the professionalism of the lawyers and Plaintiffs trusted that they were being told the
truth. At that time, Plaintiffs never thought they were not being told the truth. But then
later, Plaintiffs find out by happen chance that the information from their counsel was not
true: that Plaintiffs were suppose to get more money. Well, who is supposed to be
responsible for that; for deceiving and telling Plaintiffs what their rights were? Plaintiffs
were negotiating a final deal via counsel. What was the result of that final deal? Plaintiffs
thought that the information was the result of the final deal that everybody had agreed to
and that it was the best they could do and come up in the Plaintiffs interest, but Plaintiffs
didn't know that they had anything remaining left over. Plaintiffs didn't know what the
Basic Labor Agreement (BLA) meant under these conditions. The BLA did not address
anything about the USX plant going out of business. Plaintiffs didn't know anything
about UCC 2-106(3) about surviving rights. The Plaintiffs attorneys held this information
from the Plaintiffs; they concealed it from their clients. They concealed it fraudulently by
not letting the clients know that they were owed money and the clients never found out
until they were sitting in a court hearing when a witness, brought it up; and who was that
witness? In that hearing, Thomas Chamberlain was suing Allan Young for a finders fee
and a witness, Judge Scott Daniels brought up the topic of monies that were still owne to
the steelworkers from the Pickering v. USX case.
The Plaintiffs didn't know the truth until the 2001 hearing of Chamberlain \.
Young. If 1677 Pickering v. USX Plaintiffs did not say prior to that hearing, "Where's my
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vacation pay?", that proves that no one understood that they were entitled to any further
monies. That's the average; that would tell you that no one knew, except the client
counsel. Out of 1677 people, the likelihood that someone would raise their voice and say,
"I want my vacation pay" is so extremely likely if they knew, that it would literally be
impossible that someone would not raise such an argument. The fact that no one raised
the issue is proof that no one knew they were entitled to anything more. No steelworkers
understood that anything more was owed to them. They didn't understand what their
rights were, that's why they hired an attorney to find out. Their understanding was
entirely based on what their counsel told them. That's telling us that no worker
understood what their rights were under the conditions of the USX plant closing down.
Everyone thought their attorney was telling the truth. The attorney has a duty to tell them
and they had the right to rely on their counsel's words.
Now Judge Roth is trying to say that the steelworkers could have known. Could
the steelworkers have read the BLA? Could they have known? No, because they didn't
know what it would mean when a plant closes down. The steelworkers don't understand
complex contracts, they are steelworkers, but even for those who could read, the facts of
the situation were hidden from them.
The Statute of Limitations (SOL) issue has so little weight compared to the
damage that has been done by these criminal attorneys and is so small in comparison that
the weight of the damages far out weighs the question of SOL (if any). For Judge Roth to
put so much weight on SOL after all this litigation work right at the moment the Plaintiffs
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prove their position is an injustice being committed on a technicality to avoid the truth.
Supreme court case law says that is not supposed to happen.
So Judge Roth did not correct any of the errors that Pat Brian made in his January
12, 2006 and September 27, 2005 memorandums pertaining to vacation pay eligibility,
forfeiture, nor any other BLA regulation even after Plaintiffs showed to Judge Roth the
errors. However, Roth did see fit to overturn Pat Brian's December 5, 2003 memorandum
decision on Statute of Limitations that did favor the Plaintiffs. These facts make it
entirely clear that presuming a conspiracy exists to defeat the Plaintiffs at any turn is not
only possible, but probable, including unjustly placing a 5th Ace in the deck of cards and
calling it Statute of Limitations right at the moment when Plaintiffs check mate the
Defense.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE REILIEF SOUGHT
In this lawsuit, Plaintiffs counsel was entirely deficient and it is this reason the
Defendants were able to get away with breaking evidence rules, distorting the meaning of
the Basic Labor Agreement, and fabricating false arguments with no opposition. It is
possible that Plaintiffs counsel Evan Schmutz was in over his head. Mr. Schmutz
probably should not have taken on this case and it seems that he may have had trouble
keeping up with the facts of the case, but prior to withdrawing from the case, Evan
Schmutz's action could be perceived as having been working to help the other side. The
reason for this line of thinking is because he did absolutely nothing to stop the Defense in
the face of what should have been the most obvious weaknesses that if opposed would
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surely have won Plaintiffs the case.
Once the Plaintiffs became pro se litigants and although it required some time for
the pro se Plaintiffs to grasp how poorly this case had been handled and garner an
understanding for the legal process, in the end, the Plaintiffs had the better legal hand.
The Defendants had no substantive argument while the Plaintiffs had the facts, the law,
and the evidence on their side, but for some reason, whatever reason that may be, Judge
Roth decided to help them escape by entering on his own accord a ruling of statute of
limitations. Yet, if statute of limitations were an issue, it would have and could have been
decided along time ago. So why did Judge Roth wait until the last minute of the case to
issue the ruling of statute of limitations, especially after Plaintiffs built the winning
argument? Because the Defendants had been caught with their hand in the cookie jar so to
speak. The Defendants lost this case as a matter of law and they knew it. Judge Roth
knew it also. So why did Roth help them escape? Was it to help big name lawyers save
face? We the Plaintiffs do not know that answer and can only speculate, but what we do
know is that Judge Rothfs ruling was entirely unfair and unjust. Statute of Limitations had
already been decided upon in the Federal Court and for Roth to use that as an escape
hatch for the Defendants was not only an unjustified overturning of a Federal Ruling by
the lower court, but was another of the many dishonest and unfair actions toward pro se
Plaintiffs. The Defendants thought they could easily defeat the Plaintiffs and never
thought the Plaintiffs would be able to figure out the dirty tricks the Defendants were
attempting.
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It is not fair that the pro se Plaintiffs went through so much energy and effort to get
to the truth and then once they succeeded at recovering and winning a portion of this case
as a matter of law, that the win should be stolen from them under the guise of statute of
limitations. The Plaintiffs won this case; the Defendants know it and Judge Roth knows
it. An honest study of the material will conclude the Plaintiffs did win as fact.
The reason that the Plaintiffs motion to reconsider, motion for new trial, and
objections to the dirty tricks, errors in law, and rules of evidence violations were ignored
is because to address them and argue them would mean certain loss for the Defendants.
Statute of Limitations was the 5th Ace in the deck of cards. It was their way to "use the
law to defeat the law"; also an illegality. It seems that these Defendants can't win
anything without cheating.
As remedy to the Plaintiffs horribly deficient representation, as a solution to the
near (in not) criminal defendants, as a reward to pro se Plaintiffs who stuck to it and
established the truth as a matter of law, Plaintiffs propose to this Court the following
possible forms of relief:
Option 1: An entirely new trial. Because Plaintiffs now understand all the tricks played
by the Defendants, and because Plaintiffs now have a functional understanding of the
legal process, pro se Plaintiffs should be able to wrap this case up fairly quickly in a new
trial.
Option 2: Summary judgment favoring Plaintiffs on the vacation pay issue and a New
Trial on all remaining issues.
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Option 3: Because Defendants never produced a single authenticated accounting record,
it would be proper for summary judgment favoring plaintiffs on all issues pertaining to
this lawsuit.
Supplement to option 3: In addition to Option 3, it would be very pleasing to Plaintiffs
that they could have a New Trial on the Lost increased pensions issue because their
counsel failed to include it as a form of relief in the original complaint.
Plaintiffs are seeking relief by the lower court reversing and favoring Plaintiffs on
the vacation pay issue, and on the lost wages issue. Plaintiffs are also seeking a new trial
on the breach of fiduciary duty issue pertaining to increased pensions or a new trial on all
issues. Or summary judgment from the appeals court on the vacation pay issue.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this December X?%
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2008.

Addendum A
UCC §2-106(3) (Contracts)
ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974) §502
BLA §12-A-l-b (Vacation Pay Eligibility Requirements)
BLA §12-A-3 (Forfeiture clause for vacation pay)
BLA § 8-A and 8-B (Suspension and Discharge Procedures)

Al
Al
A2
A3
A4 - A5

UCC 2-106(3)
"Termination" occurs when either party pursuant to a power created by agreement
or law puts an end to the contract otherwise than for its breach. On "termination"
all obligations which are still executory on both sides are discharged but any right
based on prior breach or performance survives.

29 U.S.C. 1132. Civil enforcement
(ERISA sec. 502(a))
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action
A civil action may be brought (1) by a participant or beneficiary • (A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section, or
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan,
to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or
to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate relief
under section 1109 of this title;
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary
• (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or
the terms of the plan, or
(B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief
• (i) to redress such violations or
(ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan;
(4) by the Secretary, or by a participant, or beneficiary for appropriate relief in the case of
a violation of 1025(c) of this title;
(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, by the Secretary
• (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter,
or
(B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief
• (i) to redress such violation or
(ii) to enforce any provision of this subchapter; or
(6) by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty under subsection (c)(2) or (i) or (1) of this
section.
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BLA §12-A-l-b (Vacation Pay Eligibility Requirements)

Section 12 — Vacations (Contd.)

Section 12 — Vacations

preceding the weekly pay period in which the
Holiday occurs.
7. If an eligible employee performs work on a 11.20
Holiday, but works less than 8 hours, he .shall
be entitled to the benefits of this Subsection io, . k \
the extent that the number of hours worked by
him on the Holiday is less than 8, This Subsection applies in addition to the provisions of
Subsection E of Section 10, where applicable.
E. Nonduplication
1. Payment of overtime rates shall not be 11.21
duplicated for the same hours worked, but the
higher of the applicable rates shall be used.
Hours compensated for at overtime rates shall
not be counted further for any purpose in determining overtime liability under the same or any
other provisions, provided, however, that a
Holiday, whether worked or not, shall be
counted for purposes of computing overtime
liability under the provisions of Subsection
C-l-c,-d, or -e above and hours worked on a
Holiday shall be counted for purposes of computing overtime liability under the provisions
of Subsection C-l-a above.
2. Except as above provided, hours paid for but 11.22
not worked shall not be counted in determining overtime liability.
SECTION 12 — VACATIONS
A. Eligibility'

i. To be eligible for a vacation in any calendar
year during the term of this Agreement, the
employee must:
a. Have one year or more of continuous service; and
b. Not have been absent from work for six
consecutive months or more in the preceding
calendar year; except that in case of an
employee who completes one year of con-

tmuous service in such calendar year, he shall
not have been absent from work for six consecutive months or more during the 12
months following the date of his original
["' ! ernJ>royment; provided, that an employee
'with"'more than one year of continuous
service who in any year shall be ineligible for
"" a Vacation by reason of the provisions of this
paragraph as a result of an absence on
account of layoff or illness shall receive one
week's vacation with pay in such year if he
shall not have been absent from work for six
consecutive months or more in the 12 consecutive calendar months next preceding
such vacation. Any period of absence of an
employee while on vacation pursuant to this
Section or while absent due to a compensable
disability in the year in which he incurred
such disability, or while in military service
in the year of his reinstatement to employment, shall be deducted in determining the
length of a period of absence from work for
the purposes of this Subsection A-l-b.
2. Continuous service shall date from: (a) the 12.4
date of first employment at the plant (in the case
of transferred employees from any plant listed - *
in Appendix B the date shall be the date of first
employment at the plant' from which first
transferred); or (b) subsequent date of employment following a break in continuous service,
whichever of the above two dates is the later.
Such continuous service shall be calculated in
the same manner as the calculation of continuous service set forth in Subsection C,
Section 13 — Seniority, of this Agreement
except that there shall be no accumulation of
service in excess of the first two years*of*any
continuous period of absence on account of
layoff or physical disability (except, in the case
of compensable disability, as provided in
Subsection C-4, Section 13 — Seniority) in the
calculation of service for vacation eligibility.
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BLA §12-A-3 (Forfeiture clause for vacation pay)

Section 12 — Vacations (Contd.)

Section 12 — Vacations (Contd.)

3. An employee, even though otherwise eligible 12 5
under this Subsection A, forfeits the right to
receive vacation benefits under this Section if
he quits, retires, dies, or is discharged prior to
January 1 of the vacation year.

the following year will be requested to
specify in writing (not later than 30 days
after the receipt of such request), on a form
'provided by the Company, the vacation
period or periods he desires.

B. Length of Vacation
1. Effective for calendar year 1987, an eligible 12 6U
employee who has attained the years of continuous service indicated in the following table
in calendar year 1987 shall receive a vacation
corresponding to such years of continuous service as shown in the following table:

* b: Notice/vvillbe^given an employee at least 60 12.10
days in advance of the date his vacation
-period is scheduled to start, but in any event
- - not later than January 1 of the year in which
the vacation is to be taken.

Years of Service

Weeks of Vacation

1 but less than 3
3 but less than 17
17 but less than 25
25 or more

1
2
3
4

c. Vacations will, so far as practicable, be 12.11
granted at times most desired by employees
(longer service employees being given
preference as to choice); but the final right
to allot vacation periods and to change such
allotments is exclusive] y reserved to the
Company in order to insure the orderly
operation of the plants.

2. Effective for calendar year 1988, an 12.7
eligible employee who had attained the
years of continuous service indicated in
the following table in any calendar year
during the continuation of this Agreement
shall receive a vacation corresponding to
such years of continuous service as shown
in the following table:
Weeks of Vacation

Years of Service
1 but less than
3 but less than
10 but less than
17 but less than
25 or more

d. Any employee absent from work because of 12.12
layoff, disability or leave of absence at the
time employees are requested to specify the
vacation periods they desire and who has not
previously requested and been allotted a
vacation period for the calendar year, may
be notified by Management that a period is *
being allotted as his vacation period but that
he has the right within 14 days to request
some other vacation period. If any such
employee notifies Management in writing,
within 14 days after such notice is sent, that
he desires some other vacation period, he
shall be entitled to have his vacation
scheduled in accordance with paragraph
C-l-c.

1
2
3
4
5•

3
10
17
25

3. A week of vacation shall consist of 7 con- 12.8
secutive days.
C. Scheduling of Vacations
1. General
a. On or promptly after October 1 of each year, 12.9
each employee entitled or expected to
become entitled to take vacation time off in

e. If an employee is on layoff from the plant 12.13
at any time before the beginning of his
scheduled vacation hereunder, he may request to have his vacation start at any time
during such layoff and if Management
agrees to grant his request, it shall have the
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BLA § 8-A and 8-B (Suspension and Discharge Procedures)
(part 1)

Section 2 — Suspension and Discharge Oases (Contci.)

Section 6 — Suspension and OischafSfc Case*

suspension of more than 4 calendar days. Complaints concerning suspensions of 4 calendar days
or less shall be haLndiQd in accordance with Secdon
S — Adjustment of Complaints and Grievances,
Section 7 — Arbitration, and Appendix J —
Orievsr.ee snd Arbitration. Complaints concerning
suspensions of 5 calendar days or more and
discharges shall be h?ndled in accordance with die
procedure set forth below, rneluding Section 6 —
Adjustment of Complaints and Grievances, Section
7 -— Arbitration, and Appendix J — Grievance md
Arbitration.
B. Procedore
An employee shall not be peremptorily di$-l$.2
charged. In all cases in which Management may
conclude that an employee's conduct may justify
suspension or discharge, he shall be suspended
initially for not more than 5 calendar days, and
given written notice of such action. In all cases of
discharge, or of suspension for any period of time,
a copy of the discharge or suspension notice shall
be promptly furnished to such employee's grievance
committeeman,

developed bv the parties before and at the
hearing and shall include a brief written
explanation of the basis for his conclusion.
These decisions shall not be cited as a precedent
in any discussion ai my step of fee grievance
or arbitration procedure. The authority Oi u*e
arbitrator snau be tnc i"1-^-'"" !t-^:- ~i;- ---~~ --Sections 7-A iud S of the Agreement.
4, Any grievance appealed to this expedited ar- 7.31
bitration procedure must be confined io Issues
which do not involve novel problems and which
have limited contractual significance or complexity. If tire Union appeals s grievsne* to
the Board of Arbitration t*r?der circumstances where !t is clear from the
Issue embodied In the grievance that
jurisdiction io resolve the grievance lias
solely within the expedited arbitration p r e
cedure and should the Board conclude
that ft lacks jurisdiction over ihB grievance,
the Union, after such award, may not
thereafter appeal such grievance to
expedited arbitration; provided, however,
that if it Is unclear from me issue
embodied m such grievance whether
jurisdiction to resolve the grievance lies
solely within ^hB expedited arbitration procedure, but the Beard concludes ihnt it
lacks jurisdiction, the Union msy appeal
such grievance to expedited arbitration
within ten (10} days of the 6B\B of such
award.
SECTIOM 8 ~~ SUSPENSION AND
DISCHARGE CASES
A, Purpose
The purpose of this Section is to provide for the 8.1
disposition of complaints involving suspension or
discharge and to establish a special procedure for
the prompt review of cases involving discharge or

If such inidai suspension is for not more than 4 8.3
calendar days and the employee affected believes
that he has bcai unjustly dealt with, he may initiate
a complaint and have ii processed in accordance
with Section 6 — Adjustment of Complaints and Grievances, Section 7 — Arbitration, and Appendix J — Grievance and Arbitration.
If such initial suspension is for 5 calendar days BA
and if the employee affected believes he has hem
unjustly dealt with, he may request and shall be
granted, during this period, a hearing and a statement of the offense before a representative {status
of department head or higher) designed by the
general manager of the plant with or without an
assistant grievance committeeman or grievance
committeeman present as the employee may choose.
At such hearing the facts concerning the case shall
be made available to both parties. After such hear-
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BLA § 8-B (Suspension and Discharge Procedures)
(part 2)
Section 8 — Suspension and Discharge Cases (Contd.)

ing, or if no such hearing is requested, Management
may conclude whether the suspension shall be
affirmed, modified, extended, revoked, or converted into a discharge. In the event the suspension
is affirmed, modified, extended, or converted into
a discharge, the employee may, within 5 calendar
days after notice of such action, file a grievance in
the Second Step of the complaint and grievance
procedure. Final decision shall be made by the Company in this Step within 5 calendar days from the
date of the filing thereof. Such grievance shall
thereupon be handled in accordance with the procedures of Section 6 — Adjustment of Complaints
and Grievances, Section 7 — Arbitration, and
Appendix J — Grievance and Arbitration.
Grievances involving discharge which are appealed
to the Board shall be docketed, heard, and decided
within sixty (60) days of appeal, unless the Board
determines that circumstances require otherwise.
Such grievances shall be identified by the Union as
discharge grievances in the appeal to the Board.
An initial suspension for not more than 4 8.5
calendar days to be extended or converted into a
discharge must be so extended or converted within
the 4-day period, in which case the procedure outlined in the immediately preceding paragraph shall
be followed and the 5-calendar-day period for requesting a hearing shall begin when the employee
receives notice of such extension or discharge.
The Company in arbitration proceedings will 8.6
not make use of any personnel records of previous
disciplinary action against the employee involved
where the disciplinary action occurred five or more
years prior to the date of the event which is the subject of such arbitration.
An employee who is summoned to meet in an 8.7
office with a supervisor other than his own immediate supervisor for the purpose of discussing
possible disciplinary action shall be entitled to be
accompanied by his grievance committeeman or
assistant grievance committeeman if he requests

|

Section 8 — Suspension and Discharge Cases (Contd.)

'

such representation, provided such representative
1
is then available, and provided further that, if such
representative is not then available, the employee's
required attendance at such meeting shall be deferred only for such time during that shift as is
necessary to provide opportunity for him to secure
the attendance of such representative.
0. Revocation of Suspensions
or Discharges
Should any initial suspension, or affirmation, 8.8
modification, or extension thereof, or discharge be
revoked by the Company, the Company shall
reinstate and compensate the employee affected on
the basis of an equitable lump sum payment
mutually agreed to by the parties or, in the absence
of agreement, make him whole in the manner set
forth in Section 8-D below.
D. Jurisdiction of the Board
Should it be determined by the Board that an 8.9
employee has been suspended or discharged without
proper cause therefor, the Company shall reinstate
the employee and make him whole for the period
of his suspension or discharge, which shall include
providing him such earnings and other benefits as
he would have received excepl for such suspension,
or discharge, and offsetting such earnings or other
amounts as he would not have received except for
such suspension or discharge. In suspension and
discharge cases only, the Board may, where circumstances warrant, modify or eliminate the offset
of such earnings or other amounts as would not
have been received except for such suspension or
discharge.
Should it be determined by the Board that an 8.10
employee has been suspended or discharged for
proper cause therefor, the Board shall not'have
jurisdiction to modify the degree of discipline imposed by the Company; provided, however, that in
a discharge case arising out of a strike or work stoppage the Board shall have discretion, if it finds that
the Company has proper cause for discipline but
53
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Exhibit B

otherwise reasonably discoverable, "mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action does not
prevent the running of the statute of limitations." Williams, 970 P.2d at 1284 (Utah 1998) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
The undisputed facts show that plaintiffs were in possession of sufficient facts to give them
notice of their damages when they received their final settlement checks-the point at which their
cause of action accrued; and they had sufficient information to attribute such damages to breaches
of duty by defendants at the same time. While a determination whether a discovery exception is
applicable is usually "highly fact-dependent" and precludes summary judgment "in all but the
clearest of cases" (In the matter of the Malualani B. Hoopiiaina Tmsts v. Hoopiiaina, 2005 UT App.
272, f$23-24), plaintiffs here have not provided any evidence that actions of the defendants
prevented the discovery of the plaintiffs' cause of action. Similarly, the plaintiffs have not shown
that they did not know and could not reasonably have discovered and filed their claims against the
defendants within the statutory period. See Russell Packard Development, 2005 UT 14, at^[26).
The exception to the statute of limitation they seek to employ is a discovery rule; it requires
those who seek its protection to show that certain evidence necessary to establish one or more of the
elements of their claim for relief was concealed from them, and that reasonably diligent plaintiffs
in their circumstances would not have discovered such evidence until too late tofilea claim within
the statute of limitations period, given the defendants' actions. See Alfred, 2008 UT 22, at f36 (for
the discovery exception to apply, plaintiffs must first show that they "did not know and could not
reasonably have discovered the facts underlying the cause of action in time to commence an action
within [the limitations period]" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Yet plaintiffs have
not identified any pertinent material evidence that was discovered only after the passage of the
limitations period and that could not have been discovered earlier with the use of reasonable
diligence. Even where fraudulent concealment is alleged, summary judgment is appropriate where
-39-

"the facts underlying the allegation of fraudulent concealment are so tenuous, vague, or
insufficiently established that... the claim fails as a matter of law." Russell Packard Development,
2005 UT 14, at p 9 . Such is the case here.
The court concludes that, even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs,
either before or during the limitations period, they had sufficient information that, had they "acted
in a reasonable and diligent manner," they could timely have filed their case. The court further
concludes that plaintiffs have not bom the burden of establishing a question of material fact as to
the application of either the concealment prong or the exceptional circumstances prong of the
discovery exception to the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs did not file suit within the four-year
limitations period, and they have failed to show that "given the defendants'] actions, a reasonable
plaintiff would not have brought suit within the statutory period."

See Russell Packard

Development, 2005 UT 14, at 1J26.
2.

Exceptional Circumstances.

The exceptional circumstances prong of the discovery rule does not require a showing of
concealment. "Under this doctrine, the limitations period is tolled where there are exceptional
circumstances such that the application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless
of any showing that the defendant... prevented the discovery of the cause of action." Alfred, 2008
UT 22, at f36 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Williams, 970 P.2d at 1285.
The special circumstances plaintiffs appear to assert implicate their status as a "collectively
. . . undereducated group of skilled and unskilled laborers, many of whom were unable to read
effectively," who, as laymen, "depended entirely on Defendants, as their legal counsel, for advice
and information about the nature and extent of their rights and entitlements regarding the settlement
proceed[s]." Plaintiffs Memorandum, at 26. In this regard, plaintiffs assert that they could not be
expected to have discerned problems with defendants' "dissemination of work history and other
-40-

information," have "ascertained the existence of actual and legal injury, or have known about
"professional standards and practices among attorneys when accounting for and distributing
settlement funds" or "their legal right to demand a fair and principled distribution of settlement
funds, base on their individual circumstances." Plaintiffs' Memorandum, at 26.
Like the concealment prong of the discovery exception, however, "[f]or this exception to
apply, an initial showing must be made that the plaintiff did not know and could not reasonably have
discovered the facts underlying the cause of action in time to commence an action within [the
limitations period]." Alfred, 2008 UT 22, at ^[36 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
As discussed above, plaintiffs have failed to make this initial showing.
3.

Conclusion.

Finally, plaintiffs have presented no evidence pointing to any particular "discovery,"
occurring after the passage of the statutory period, when knowledge of a recently discovered fact
completed the puzzle and thereby allowed a plaintiff at some identifiable point to realize that
defendants had wronged him or her, a realization that had not reasonably been possible at an earlier
time due to concealment or exceptional circumstances. This complete failure to identify a particular
event or moment when they finally discovered facts indicating that defendants had breached a duty
in setting up the hearing process makes it impossible to discern the point in time that the plaintiffs
claim that the statute of limitations should have begun to run, if not at the time the Hearing Award
Decision was issued or the final settlement checks distributed.
Like the plaintiff in Williams, plaintiffs here do not "offer a reasonable explanation as to why
fthey]-either pro se or with assistance of legal counsel-could not have filed an action against [the
defendants] at some time between" March 1996 and March 2000. Williams, 970 P.2d at 1286.
Without such a showing, plaintiffs have failed to present a viable case for application of either the
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SANDY DEPARTMENT

RONALD J. CHILTON, et al,
Plaintiffs,

:

vs

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Defendant's Motion to Dismiss)

:

Case No. 030105887
(Previous Case No. 020404957)

:

Judge PAT B. BRIAN

ALLEN K. YOUNG,*/a/..
Defendants.

The above matter came before the Court for status hearing on September 22, 2003. At
that hearing, the parties informed the Court that Allen K. Young's (Defendant) motion to dismiss
was pending and was ready for decision on the papers. Upon review of the parties filings,
applicable statutes and case law, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion to dismiss, which this
Court treated as a motion for summary judgment, based on following decision.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed this law suit against their former attorney alleging legal malpractice and
fraudulent misrepresentation in litigation against Plaintiffs former employer. A motion to
dismiss admits the facts as pleaded in the complaint as true, therefore, the following facts are
derived from the complaint. The 124 Plaintiffs are all former employees of the Orem facility of
United States Stee! ccrpcration ("USX1') who were laid off during a "hot idle11 period. On behalf
of Plaintiffs as their attorney, Defendant caused to filed a law suit against USX Pickering v. USX
Corporation, (federal caie) in the: United States District Court which was assigned to Judge
Bruce S. Jenkins (Judge Jenkins). One of the many issues in the federal case was whether
Plaintiffs were entitled tc a monetary award for vacation pay for the 1988 calendar year.-

In the federal case, some piainnrrs were oesignateu as uenweauiei piamum. many ui
the issues involving the bellweather plaintiffs were heard and determined on the merits. For
example, Judse Jenkins awarded bellweather plaintiff William Thomas back pay, waaes, sick
pay. vacation pay, incentive pav and other employee compensatJAaj^m^

he

would have received during the idling period less any amount of income earned byjhjyjyjt^au^
employment during the same pmad*
Subsequently, Defendant negotiated a proposed settlement of the USX case with the USX
defendants. Defendant addressed the terms of the proposed settlement with Plaintiffs at a
meeting held on June 28, 1995 at Mountain View High School in Orem, Utah (meeting). At the
meetina, Defendant represented to Plaintiffs that the proposed settlement would give them,
everything Judge Jenkins had awarded the bellweather plaintiffs. Jn reliance upon Defendant's
representation that they would receive what the bellweather plaintiffs had received, the Plaintiffs
accepted the proposed settlement upon the terms suggested to them by Defendant at the meeting.
Defendant obtained releases for any liability as a result of the settlement achieved in the
federal case. Plaintiffs executed the releases in reliance upon the representations made to them in
the meeting. Defendant's representations made to Plaintiffs at the meeting were false because
they did not receive vacation pay for 1988 like some of the bellweather plaintiffs.
On November 5, 2002, Plaintiffs filed the present law suit alleging causes of action
against Defendant for (1) fraudulent misrepresentation, (2) legal malpractice - breach of contract,
(3) legal malpractice - breach of fiduciary duty and (4) legal malpractice - negligence.1

1

The Court notes that the law suit was filed in the Fourth District Court. However, the
Fourth District Court was recused from the case by its presiding judge and the case was
-2-

On December 16, 2002, Defendant filed the present motion to dismiss claiming that
Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because the statute of
limitations has run on all of Plaintiffs causes of action. On January 2, 2003, Plaintiffs filed their
opposition to Defendant's motion to dismiss. On January 15, 2003, Defendant filed his reply to
Plaintiffs opposition.
On September 22, 2003, a status hearing was held and the parties informed the Court that
the motion to dismiss was ready for decision on the papers.
On November 14, 2003, Ronald Chilton (Chilton), one of the plaintiffs, filed a letter
stating that he was concerned about the status of the case and the representation by his counsel.
Chilton argues that the Plaintiffs could not have discovered Defendant's alleged fraud until a trial
in the Chamberlain/Young case in April and May of 2001, Chilton states that Judge Scott
Daniels stated in his opinion after reading Judge Jenkins ruling that Young owed vacation pay to
all Plaintiffs in the Pickering/USX case.
LAW
Utah R. Civ, P. 12(b)(6) provides a court may dismiss a cause of action if a party fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss "admits the
facts alleged in the complaint, but challenges the plaintiffs right to relief based on those facts."
St. Benedict's Dev. Co, v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991). If matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, then the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Utah R.

transferred to the Third District Court and assigned to the West Valley Department.

Here, Plaintiffs opposition and the letter from a single Plaintiff were submitted. These
were not excluded by the Court, therefore, the Court treats the motion as a motion for summary
judgment
Rule 56(c) provides a court may grant summary judgment if no genuine issues of material
fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court shall view
all facts in favor of the nonmoving party.
Generally, a statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action arises.
Davidson Lumber v. Bonneville lnv.7 794 P.2d 11, 19 (Utah 1990). However, the judicially
created equitable "exceptional circumstances" rule permits the discovery rule to toll the statute of
limitations. Sevy v. Security Title Co.r 902 P.2d 629 (Utah 1995); see also Sevey v. Security Title
Co., 857 P.2d 958 (Utah Ct. App 1993). The discovery rule is that a party shall exercise
reasonable diligence to discover a cause of action against defendants or the cause of action shall
be barred by the statute of limitations. Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 294 Utah Adv.
Rep. 30 (Utah Ct. App 1996)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26 provides a three year statute of limitations in cases of fraud
and begins to accrue when aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake may be
reasonably discovered. Plaintiffs are required to exercise "reasonable diligence" in discovering
fraud. Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993). A cause of action for breach of contract
shall be filed within six years of the breach. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23; see also Butcher v,
Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311 (Utah Ct App 1987). Causes of action for negligence and breach of
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fiduciary duty shall be filed within tour years or Giscovery or me oreacn. uum

LUUC mm.
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12-25
ANALYSIS
Here. Plaintiffs were clients of Defendant attorney in a complex, class action litigation,
who relied on the advice of counsel Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the
Court concludes that genuine issues of material fact exist, therefore, Defendant is not entitled to
summary judgment. For example, genuine issues of material fact exist with regard to whether
Plaintiffs made a reasonable effort to discover and when Plaintiffs may have reasonably
discovered Defendant's fraud, breach of contract, breach offiduciaryduty and negligence and,
therefore, when the statute of limitations began to accrue There are insufficient facts before the
Court to decide as a matter of law that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment
The Court DENIES Defendant's motion to dismiss, which this Court treated as a motion
for summary judgment
So ordered this J 2 L day of December 2003 By the Court

PAT B.BRIAN
Third District Court Judae

""
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1995 WL 584372
(Cite as. 1995 W L 584372 (D.Utah))
after this second.phase of tnal See Part V], mfi a
"Idling" ("Active" and "Management") Plaintiffs
A<; to the "Active" and "Management" plaintiffs
whose pension benefits were impaired by the
indefinite idling of Geneva m February 1987
following the end of the work stoppage, this Court
found in Pickenng 1 that "the plaintiffs are entitled
to continued benefits as if Geneva had not been
idled at that time Further, these benefits continued
to accrue up to <he moment m time in which USX
lawfully shut down, sold or otherwise disposed of
Geneva" 809 F Supp at 1552 This Court then
concluded that "the Active and Management
plaintiffs' damages or measure of relief must be
measured withm the terms of the 1987 BLA 'as if
they had remained active employees who were
terminated when Geneva was sold to BIvl & T in
August of 1987" Id Under Pickenng 1, the
"Idling" plamtliTs, individual remedies must be
determined with reference to the seven-month
"idling" period from February 1 1987 through
August 31,1987
Plaintiffs 'had argued for accrual of benefits
through an assumed shutdown date of October
1989, based upon a public promise made by the
company's chairman
This Court rejected the
October 1989 date in Pickering J for the reason that
USX was not "legally bound by its promise to keep
Geneva open" Id See geneially Local 1330,
United Steel Woikers of Ameuco v United Slates
Sreel Coip,
631 F 2d 3264 (6th Cir 1980)
(company not bound by public promise to keep
plant open so long as plant remains profitable)
This Ccvl also found that the plaintiffs had "failed
to establish a prima facie case" showing that USX
had sold Geneva to B M & T for the purpose of
interfering with plaintiffs' attainment of pension
benefit rights, particularly rights which would
accrue upon a total plant shutdown Id at 1556,
1558
*7 to this second phase of trial, plaintiffs have
overhauled their argument concerning the sale of
Geneva to BM & T and the October 1989 date
[FN5j Plaintiffs now aver that "but for" the
indefinite idling of Geneva following the end of the
work stoppage m 1986—which this Court previously
found to have been prompted by unlawful motives,
violating § 510-Geneva would not have been sold
to BM <£ T at all Instead, plaintiffs postulate,
Copr ©West 2004 No (

Geneva would have resumed normal operations
and, driven by the demands of Pit-Cal,.would have
continued operations until at least October of 1989
See Part IV. mfia Plaintiffs suggest that the Court
need not find that the t>ak of Geneva was prompted
by unlawful anti pension benefit animus in order to
extend the remedial period under § 510 through the
October 1989 date Cf Gaddy v ABEX Corp, 884
F 2 d 312, 339 (7th Cir 1989), Whailey v Skaggs
Companies, Inc. 707 F 2d 1129, 1138 (10th
Cir 1983)
Plaintiffs adamantly insist that the Court address
the question of the proper remedial period in terms
of this "but for" analysis, citing cases such as
Aguinaga v United Food & Commercial Workers
lnt'1 Union, 993 F 2d 1463 (10th Cir 1993)
The purpose of a back pay award is to make the
employee whole-1 e restore the economic status
quo that would have obtained but foi the
wrongdoing on the part of the employer and the
union
It is improper, however, to award back
pay if it can be shown that the employees would
have lost their jobs at a later date even if they had
been treated faul)
The burden is on the
defendant to prove bv a preponderance of the
evidence that an employee would have been
discharged or laid off at a later date, or that the
employee's job would have been phased out, even
if no [wrongful conduct] had occurred, .. and the
defendant has a right to present such evidence in
defending a claim for damages
993 F 2 d at 1473 (emphasis added & citations
omitted)
'LaRoche" and 'Idling' Plaintiffs' Section 204(h)
Claims
With respect to the "LaRoche" and "Idling"
plaintiffs' claims under § 204(h) of ERISA, this
Court earlier determined that the appropriate
remedy would be to compute plaintiffs' pension
benefits as if the unlawful amendment had not
occurred See Pickenng 7 809 F Supp at 1564, cf
Pran v Petroleum Piod Management
Employee
Sav Plan <£ Trust, 920 F 2d 6 5 1 , (10th Cir 1990) (
"[sjubsequent unilateral adoption of an amendment
which is then used to defeat or diminish the
plaintiffs fully vested rights under the governing
plan document is not only ineffective, but also
arbitrary and capricious ") [FN6]

to Ong U S Govt Works
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1995 WL 584372
(Cite as: 3995 WL 584372 (DJUtnh» .
should be calculated on the basis of each plaintiffs'
income at USX as reflected in USX payroll records
and utilized by Dr Randle and Mr Norman
without adjustments based upon the BM & T
experience
As to the question of whether Dr Randle overstates
plaintiffs1 back pay by usmg 80-plus-hour pay
periods as a starting point, it almost looks as though
USX's assertion that plaintiffs1 back pay should be
computed based upon the historical average of
hours worked 'during a pay period whipsaws
• plaintiffs berween the operation of Geneva absent
the labor reduction program and the 80- plus-hour
minimum standard that USX asserts plaintiffs must
meet in order to show a likelihood of recall (See
Tx '11/4/93, at 287-346 (testimony of David
Braithwaite) ) ]f one listens to USX on entitlement,
plamtiffs should only receive back pay for those
pay periods where there was eighty hours or more
of work for them to do If one listens, to USX on
amount, back pay should be computed on the basis
that the prevailing plaintiff would have worked less
than those same eighty-or-more hours
_^
The Court has considered the eighty-or-more hours
analysis as a factor in determining individual
plamtiffs' entitlement to a remedy for USX's failure
to recall and n seems fair to evaluate the back pay
to be- awarded in that same light [FN48] The Court
adopts Dr Randle's analysis of back pay based
upon income earned during p a y periods in which a
plaintiff worked 80 or more hours, and rejects Mr
Norman's proffered adjustment to base projected
earnings on actual historical averages
^ /
*43 In terms of lost employee we1,r3Te benefits,
such as health or medical insurance coverage lost
during layoff periods, the Court has concluded that
recovery under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA for those
losses should be limited to out- of-pocket health,
medical, or insurance premium costs, rather than the
computed "cost of the benefit" to USX Cf Tolan
v Levi Svauss & Co 867 F2d 467 470 (8tb
Or 1989), Foust v International Brotheihood oj
Elecmcal Workers, 572 F 2 d 710, 718 & n la
(10th Cir 1978)
Offsets Against Backpay Awards
Besides hotly contesting the availability of a back
-pay remedy under § 502(a)(3) after Menem, USX
also claim* a series o f offsets against any back pa\

award that this- Court may make in favor of any of
the bellwether plaintiffs on their § 510 claims
(1) Plaintiffs*Duty to Mitigate
Plaintiffs do not dispute that they have a general
duty to mitigaie josses flowing from USX's
wrongful conduct m failing to recall them 10 work, at
Geneva following a lavoff, or m deciding to
"indefinitely idle" the plant following the end of the
work stoppage m February, 1987 See, eg, Unued
States v Lee Way Motor Freight, 6i5 F.2d 918
936-38 (10th d r 1979), Equal
Employment
Oppouumry Commission v Sandia Corp, 639 F 2 d
600, 627 (10th O r 1980) They concede that at
least some income earned from other employment
should be offset against amounts of back pay
awarded on the theory that they should have been
back to work at Geneva at the same time. (See Tx
10/13/93 (Pretrial Conference) at 36 12-1B (Mr
Orlofsky)) They do assert that the burden of
proving offsets or a failure tc mitigate falls properly
upon USX Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Memorandum on «
Legal Issues, dated December 13, 1993 (dkt n o
758),'at 18 Following the Title VI] analogy, USX
must show that ,(]) a particular plaintiff failed to
exercise reasonable diligence to mitigate his or her
damages, and (2) there was a reasonable likelihood
that the plaintiff would have found comparable
work by exercising reasonable diligence Gaddy v
Abex Corp, 884 F.2d 312, 318 (7th Crr.1989), see
also, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
v Sandia Corp, 639 F 2d at 627
(2) Earned Income (Wages, Sc lary, etc)
"Plamnffs' own back pay calculations reflect an
adjustment for "miugating income," defined as "all
income received from employment other than USX
employment during this period of time, not
including income earned from investments" (Tr
10/19/93, at 48919-21 (testimony of Di Paul
Randle)) Dr Randle included vacation pay m his
calculation of mitigating mccme (Id at 49014-16
See?X546A)
Plamtiffs submit that the proper method for
calculation of offsets based upon wages, salaries or
other compensation earned by a particular plaintiff
during the same penod for winch he or she receives
an award of back pay under § 502(a)(3) is the "pay
period" approach exemplified by the National
Labor Relations Board's formula approved m
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Judge Jenkins* Memorandum Decision, May 5,1995, Page 193
286.

The Courtfindsthat Mr. Christophersonrs continuous service at USX adjusted to

account for the Court'sfindingsherein (viz. an additional seven months (0.58 years), would total
3 L71 years of service, yielding an additional benefit accrual of $11.60. (See DT I32-C; Tr.
11/5/93, at 525:1-25 (testimony of Arthur Hallett).)
287.

The Courtfindsthat Mr. Christopherson is eligible to receive a USX "Rule of 65*

pension immediately upon quitting or otherwise losing his employment at BM&T.103
288.

Mr. Christopherson is also entitled to receive retiree medical insurance under the

Program of Hospital-Medical Benefits for Eligible Pensioners and Surviving Spouses, and USX
retiree life insurance coverage. (DT 345; Tr. 11/9/93, at 674:11-25 (testimony of William
Roderick).)
289.

Mr. Christopherson has established his entitlement to "other appropriate equitable

relief on Ms claims under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA, 29 U.S.CA. § 1132(a)(3) (1985) Hto redress
such violations," which includes an award of back pay (wages, sick leave, vacation pay, incentive
pay or other employee compensation) equal to the compensation he would have received during
the "idling" period set forth above, less any amount of income earned by him through other
employment during the same period.
Pension Remedy - Section 204(h) of ERISA
290.

As a result of Mr. Christopherson's BM&T service and this Court's ruling under

Section 204(h), he earned an additional accrued benefit of $130.13 per month. (DT 132-C; Tr.
31/5/93, at 521:10-528:11, 591:16-598:16. (testimony of Arthur Hallett).) Mr. Cbristopherson's

Sec also, Defendant's Post-Hearing Memorandum (Damage Phase), dated December 13,1993 (dkt no. 757), at
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iaita Gznev* following ih^ end of the work steppage, Mr. Vincent woma na*e uccn itc&uea u>
work on or about February 14, I9S7.
jiy*
HU / .

nt^:—*:«fr«H Uo*
i iOU-uij-i

s have established by a preponderance of the evidence that UbX failed TO

recall employees, including Mr. Vincent, following the end of the work steppage on February I,
19S7, as a proximate .consequence of USX*s decision to indefinitely idle Geneva. The intent "to
discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary
for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may
become entitled under the plan" in violation of § 510 of ERISA, 11 U.S.C.A. § 1140 (1985), was
a substantial motivating factor in USX's decision to idle the plant.
408.

Absent an award of injunctive and "other appropriate equitable relief to plaintiffs

under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(3) (1985), USX would realize substantial
savings in terms of benefit expenses by reason of its decision to indefinitely idle the Geneva plant
in 1987.
Equitable Relief- Section 510 of ERISA
409.

Mr. Vincent has established his entitlement to an order enjoining acts and practices

of USX which perpetuate its violation of § 510 of ERISA, 11 U.S.C.A. § 1140 (1985), and
requiring that the accraal of pension benefits in favor of Mr. Vincent under the USX pension plan
be adjusted so as to take into account the reconstruction of his employment history as set forth
above.
410.

The Court finds that Mr. Vincent's continuous service at USX, adjusted to account

for the Court'sfindingsherein (viz. an additional seven monthi(0.58 years)).Would total 19.0
years of service, yielding an additional benefit accrual of $11.78. (See DT 132-C.)
-231 -

rage vu 01 J UD

199'5WL5S4372
(Cite as: J995 WL 584372 (D.Utah))
USX's decision to idle the plant.

up to the date of his retirement.

*119 408. Absent an award of injunctive and
"other appropriate equitable relief1 to plaintiffs
under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA, 29 U.S.CA. §
1132(a)(3) (1985), USX would realize substantial
savings in terms of benefit expenses by reason of its
decision to indefinitely idle the Geneva plant in
1987.

LAROCHE PLAINTIFF

Equitable Relief-Section 510 of ERISA
409. Mr. Vincent has established his entitlement to
an order enjoining acts and practices of USX which
perpetuate its violation of § 510 of ERISA, 11
U.S.CA. § 1140 (1985), and requiring that the
accrual of pension benefits in favor of Mr. Vincent
under the USX pension plan be adjusted so as to
take into account the reconstruction of his
employment history as set forth above.
-""""""^
410. The Court finds that Mr. Vincent's continuous \
service at USX, adjusted lo account for the Court's ',
findings herein (viz an additional seven months )
(0.58 years)), -would total 19.0 years of service, /
yielding, an additional benefit accrual of $11.78. ( /
See DT 132-C.)
_ _ _ ^
S2

H47-MT^incent has established his entitlement to
"other appropriate equitable relief on his claims
under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA, 29 U.S.CA. §
1132(aX3) (1985) "to' redress such violations,"
which includes an award of back pay (wages, sick
leave, vacation pay, incentive pay or other
employee compensation) equal to the compensation
he would have received during the "idling" period
set forth above, less any amount of income earned
by him through other employment during the same
period.
Pension Remedy-Section 204(h) of ERJSA
412 As a result of Mr. Vincent's BM & T service
and this Court's ruling under Section 204(h), he
earned an additional accrued benefit of $109.91 per
month. (DT 132-C) Mr. Vincent's balance in the
BM & T pension plan as of February 1, 1993, was
$8,989.09. (DT 307-C) At the time of Mr.
Vincent's retirement under the terms of the USX
pension plan, his accrued benefit of $109.91 per
month, reduced to present value, will be offset by
the amount of his account balance in the BM & T
pension plan as of February 1, 1993, plus interest
Copr. © West 2004 Mo (
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Rex Christensen
413. Mr. Christensen was born on August 15, 1934
and began his employment with USX on October
20, 1954. (PTO Uncontroverted Facts J J37.)
414. Mr. Christensen is a Count IX-LaRoche
plaintiff. While at USX he worked, primarily as an
operator and laborer; he is a union represented
employee. (PTO at 5; PTO Uncontroverted Facts
1138.)
415. Mr. Christensen was transferred to LaRoche
Industries upon sale of the nitrogen facilities by
USX to LaRoche Industries. He has continued his
employment at LaRoche as a laborer since the time
of the sale. Throughout his employment at
LaRoche. Mr. Christensen has been a participant in
the retirement and other employee benefit plans
offered at LaRoche. He is eligible for a 30- year •
sole option pension. (PTO Uncontroverted Facts %
139.)
• ANALYSIS
The • parties agree that Mr. Christensen's only
remaining claim in this case is under ERJSA §
204(h). (PTO Uncontroverted Facts % 140.) He
claims the present value of six years' accrual under
the USX pension plan. (Tr. 10/13/93 (Pretrial
Conference) at 64.)
*120 USX argues that Mr. Christensen is not
entitled to any remedy under § 204(h) of ERJSA
because the accrued benefit he earned under the
USX pension plan during his employment at
LaRoche through February 1, 1993 was less than
the accrued pension benefit earned under the
LaRoche pension plan during that time. (DT
132-B, at 2: DT 132-C; Tr. 11/5/93, at
519:5-521:9 (testimony of Arthur Hallett).) H may
be more accurate to say that Mr. Christensen is
entitled to the additional accruals under § 204(h).
subject to offsetting accruals under the LaRoche
plan. According to Arthur Hallett, assuming Mr.
Christensen retired during November 1993 "[t]he
result would be that the $139.52 fUSX accrual]
would be totally offset by the $152.75 [LaRoche
accrual]. And USX's obligation would be to pay
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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Stctfoa a ~ M*naeem*m
parties M t t i o Board of Arbitration or (lift refer
the iftttfgfo bao* t« the plant without resolutionftiWtifch even* the specific disputes wfif
tar hgndted under the provisions of this section at fit* time they may arise.
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ransfer, and the right to reheve employees from
nty because of lade of work or for other legitimate
reasons.

SECTION 4 - RESPONSIBILITIES
OF THE PARTIES
J, District Plreotor/Company Labor Relations
ftepresentetlyj*
Each of the parties hereto acknowledges the <u
ft Is Via intent of the parties that the * I rights and responsibilities of the other party and
agrees to discharge its responsibilities under this
members of the joint plant contrasting out
eomrjiltfes shall engage In discussions of the
jAgreernent,
profcte/n involved irt thl$ flefd in a good-faJth
The Union (its officers and representatives, at 4,2
effort fo Arrive at mutual understanding $0
all levels) and all employees lare bound to 'observe
that dispute* 9nd grievances can be avoided.
the provisions of this Agreement,
If either the Company or the Union members
The Company (its officers arid representatives, 4.3
of tho eoipmlitee fool that this Is pot being
jat all levels) is bound to observe the provisions of
dona, they may appeal to the District Director
(this Agreement.
of tho Union who has Jurisdiction of tha plant
in question and tho appropriate representative , In addition to the responsibilities that may be 4.4
of the Cpmpany Headquarters for review of
provided elsewhere in this Agreement, the followthe complaint about the failure of the commitwig shall be observed:
tee to properjy function- Such appoaJ shall
L There shall be no intimidation or coercion of 45
result In a prompt Investigation by the District
employees into joining the Union or continuDirector or hie de$Ignet*d representative and
ing
tfcfir membership therein.
r
the Company's tabor relations representative
2. There shall be no Union activity on Company 4.8
designated for such review. Thl? provision
should In no way affect the rights of the partune.
ties In connection with the processing of any
3. Thaie shaft be no strikes, work stoppages, or 4J
grievance relating to the subject of contractintemiptioa or impeding of work, No officer
ing out.
or representative of tne Union shall authorize,
instigate, aid, or condone any such activities.
No employee shall participate m any such
activities.
SECTION 3 - MANAGEMENT
The Company retains the exclusive rights to 31 4- The applicable procedures of the Agreement 4.8
will be followed for the settlement of all commanage the business and plants and to direct the
plaints
or grievances
worfcing forces. The Company, in the exercise of
ttb rights, shall observe the provisions of this
5, There shall be no interference with the right of 4.9
Agreement,
employees to become or continue as Wrrrbers
of the Union.
The rights co manage the bubiness and plants 3.2 6. There shall be no discrimination, restraint, or 4.10
and to dfrect the working forces include the right
coercion against any employee because of
to hire, suspend or discharge for proper cause* or
membership in the Union.
24
25

Section 8 •— Suspension and Discharge Cases

developed by the parties before and at the
hearing and shall include a brief written
explanation of the basis for tds conclusion.
These decisions shall not be cited as a precedent
in any discussion at any step of the grievance
or arbitration procedure. The authority of the
arbitrator shall be the same as that provided in
Sections 7-A and 8 of thz Agreement.
4, Any grievance appealed to ibis expedited ar- 7.31
bitration procedure must be confined to i&oues
which <Xo not involve novel piofalerns and which
have limited cona actual significance or complexity. If the Union appeals a grievance to
the Board of Arbitration under c!r°
Giimstances where ft Is dear from the
Issue embodied In the grievance that
jurisdiction to resolve the grievance lies
solely within the expedited arbitration procedure and should the Board conclude
that it lacks jurisdiction over the grievance,
the Union, after such award, may not
thereafter appeal such grievance to
expedited arbitration; provided, however,
that If It is unclear from she issue
embodied in such grievance whether
jurisdiction to resolve the grievance lies
solely within the expedited arbitration prooedure, hut the Board concludes that It
lacks jurisdiction, the Union may appeal
such grievance to expedited arbitration
within ten (10) days o! the date of such

SECTION 8 ~ SUSPENSION AMD
DISGHARGE CASES
A, Purpose
The purpose of this Section is to provide for the 8.1
disposition of complaints involving suspension or
discharge and to establish a special procedure for
the prompt review of cases involving discharge or
50
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suspension of more than 4 calendar days. Compjaints concerning suspensions of 4 calendar days
or lesa shall be handi&d in accordance with Section
6 — Adjustment of Complaints and Grievances,
Section ? — Arbitration, and appendix J ~~
CMevance snd Arbitration. Complaints concerning
suspensions of 5 calendar days oi more and
discharges sh?H he handled m accordance wldi the
procedure ^t forth below, Including Section 6 —
Adjustment of Complaints and Grievances, Section
7 — Arbitration, and Appendix J —* Grievance snd
Arbitration.
B, Procedure
^
An employee shall not be peremptorily d:s-"&2
charged, in all cases in which Management may
conclude that an employee's conduct may justify
suspension or discharge, he shall be suspended
inihailly for not more than ,5 calendar days, and
given written notice of such action. In all cases of
discharge, or of suspension for any period of time,
a copy of the discharge or suspension notice shall
be promptly furnished to such employee's grievance
committeeman.
If such initial suspension is for not more than 4 8.3
calendar days and the employee affected believes
that he has b&Qn unjustly dealt with, he may initiate
a complaint and have it processed in accordance
with Section 6 — Adjustment of Complaints and
Grievances, Section 7 — Arbitration, and Appendix •
J — Grievance and Arbitration.
If such initial suspension is for 5 calendar days 8.4
and if the employe affected believes he has been
unjustly dealt with, he may request and shall be
granted, during this period, a hearing and a &tatement of the offense before a representative (stait$
of department head or higher) designated by the
general manager of the plani with or without an
assistant grievance committefsman or grievance
committeeman present as the employee may choose.
At such hearing the facts concerning the case shall
be made available to both parties. After such hear51
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Section 12 — Vacations

preceding the weekly pay period in which the
Holiday occurs.
7. If an eligible employee performs work on a 11.20
Holiday, but works less than 8 hours, he^hap
be entitled to the benefits of this Subsectionio *..,; i
the extent that the number of hours worked by
him on the Holiday is less than 8. This Subsection applies in addition to the provisions of
Subsection E of Section 10, where applicable,
E, Nonduplicaiion
1. Payment of overtime rates shall not be 11.21
duplicated for the same hours worked, but the
higher of the applicable rates shall be used.,
Hours compensated for at overtime rates shall
not be counted further for any purpose in determining overtime liability under the same or any
other provisions, provided, however, that a
Holiday, whether worked or not, shall be
counted for purposes of computing overtime
liability under the provisions of Subsection
C-l-c,-d, or -e above and hours worked on a
Holiday shall be counted for purposes of computing overtime liability under the provisions
of Subsection C-l-a above.
2. Except as above provided, hours paid for but 11.22
not worked shall not be counted in determining overtime liability.
SECTION 12 -

VACATIONS

A. Eligibility'
1. To be eligible for a vacation in any calendar 12.1
year during the term of this Agreement, the
employee must:
a. Have one year or more of continuous ser-12.2
vice; and
b. Not have been absent from work for six 12.3
consecutive months or more in the preceding
calendar year; except that in case of an
employee who completes one year of con88

tinuous service in such calendar year, he shall
not have been absent from work for six consecutive months or more during the 12
months following the date of his original
J^* jerrMbyment; provided, that an employee
' with*'more than one year of continuous
service who in any year shall be ineligible for
c
a: Vacation by reason of the provisions of this
paragraph as a result of an absence on
account of layoff or illness shall receive one
week's vacation with pay in such year if he
shall not have been absent from work for sbi
consecutive months or more in the 12 consecutive calendar months next preceding
such vacation. Any period of absence of an
employee while on vacation pursuant to this
Section or while absent due to a compensable
disability in the year in which he incurred
such disability, or while in military service
in the year of his reinstatement to employment, shall be deducted in determining the
length of a period of absence from work for
the purposes of this Subsection A-l-b.

-1

2. Continuous service shall date from: (a) the 12.4
date of first employment at the plant Cm the case
of transferred employees from any plant listed-«
in Appendix B the date shall be the date of first
employment at the plant" from which first
transferred); or (b) subsequent date of employment following a break in continuous service,
whichever of the above two dates is the later.
Such continuous service shall be calculated in
the same manner as the calculation of continuous service set forth in Subsection C,
Section 13 — Seniority, of this Agreement
except that there shall be no accumulation of
service in excess of the first two years'bf any
continuous period of absence on account of
layoff or physical disability (except, in the case
of compensable disability, as provided in
Subsection C-4, Section 13 — Seniority) in the
calculation of service for vacation eligibility.
89
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3. An employee, even though otherwise eligible 12L5
under this Subsection A, forfeits the right to
receive vacation benefits under this Section if
he quits, retires, dies, or is discharged prior to
January 1 of the vacation year,
B. Length of Vacation
1. Effective for calendar year 1987, an eligible 12.6 *
employee who has attained the years of continuous service indicated in the following table
in calendar year 1987 shall receive a vacation
corresponding to such years of continuous service as shown in the following table:
Years of Service

Weeks of Vacation

1 but less than 3
3 but less than 17
17 but less than 25
25 or more

1
2
3
4

2. Effective for calendar year 1988, an 1Z7
eligible employee who had attained the
years of continuous service indicated in
the following table in any calendar year
during the continuation of this Agreement
shall receive a vacation corresponding to
such years of continuous service as shown
in the following table:
Years of Service

Weeks of Vacation

1 but less than 3
3 but less than 10
10 but less than 17
17 but less than 25
25 or more

1
2
3
4
5

3. A week of vacation shall consist of 7 con- 12,8
secutive days,
C- Scheduling of Vacations
1. General
a. On or promptly after October 1 of each year, 12 9
each employee entitled or expected to
become entitled to take vacation time off in
90
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the following year will be requested to
specify in writing (not later than 30 days
.afterfthe receipt of such request), on a form
provided by the Company, the vacation
period or periods he desires,
j

yb, Notice^will^beeiven an employee at least 60 12,1
tfayi in aavaiise of the date his vacation
period is scheduled to start, but in any event
- ~ not later than January 1 of the year in which
the vacation is to be taken.
c. Vacations will, so far as practicable, be 12,1
granted at times most desired by employees
(longer service employees being given
preference as to choice); but the final right
to allot vacation periods and to change such
allotments is exclusively reserved to the
Company in order to insure the orderly
operation of the plants,
d. Any employee absent from work because of 12,1:
layoff, disability or leave of absence at the
time employees are requested to specify the
vacation periods they desire and who has not
previously requested and been allotted a
vacation period for the calendar year, may
be notified by Management that a period is *
being allotted as his vacation period but that
he has the right within 14 days to request
some other vacation period. If any such
employee notifies Management in writing,
within 14 days after such notice is sent, that
he desires some other vacation period, he
shall be entitled to have his vacation
scheduled in accordance with paragraph
C-l-c,
e. If an employee is on layoff from the plant 12.13
at any time before the beginning of his
scheduled vacation hereunder, he may request to have his vacation start at any time
during such layoff and if Management
agrees to grant his request, it shall have the
91
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Ronald Chilton
214 East 1350 North
Lehi, Utah 84043
November 20, 2003

xr

i°

Honorable Judge Pat Brian
3rd District Court
West Valley, Utah
Civil $030105887
Dear Judge Pat Brian,
This letter is in reference to a my letter, on November 13, 2003 filed-with the court (Enclosed is a copy
of said letter). The reasons for my letters to the court is to establish an " alternative starting date" of
when we the plaintiffs became aware of the allegedfraud We discovered the vacation pay issue in the
(Chamberlain /Young)Case # 9700400240 in the Orem, Utah 4lh district court, April-May 2001.
Also enclosed is a copy of the first courtfiling,case # 010403553 4th District Court, Provo, Utah/Filed
on July 30, 2001. (This was only two months after we became aware of Vacation Pay fraud.)
This case was later sent to 3rd district Court, in Salt Lake City. And assigned to
Judge Tyron Medley, and assigned a new case # 020906405. Enclosed is a copy of Judge Medleys'
Ruling to dismiss this case WITH OUT PREDUUCE because of our attorney, James C. Haskins was
negligent in serving Allen Young in a timely manner.
On the 26 of Sept. in your court, you asked both parties if they had everything in their briefs concerning
our case, however, 1 feel you need this new information, (facts) as our attorney has not represented the
plaintiffs fairly in this "(alternative starting date)" (April (May 2001). As 1 stated before, my attorney
will not return any calls, or accept mail, enclosed is a copy of my letter that was marked " unclaimed" to
-James G. Haskins. - - -_
-- .
Please let us-have our day in Court.

Sincerely,

Ronald Chilton

(/

JO

r^ra^

r*?u r(y

]°Ii*» + #,*

tfouytDirS

T~h~u/'C you.
STL-1656
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Ronald Chilton
214 East 1350 North

- - -" --/''Art J HEW

November 13, 2003

- V CLFRK
Honorable Judge Pat Brian
3rd District Court
West Valley, Utah
Civil #030105887
Dear Judge Pat Brian
J am a client of James C. Haskins In the Third District Court action (Ronald Chilton /Allen Young).
1 came to the courthouse, 3rd. District in West Valley and pulled up our case documents, to make sure
The facts as discussed with Mr Haskins and assured by Mr, Thomas Thompson were in the brief
submitted to the court. While he has argued several issues of our case, Ifind thai he has not responded to
several key issues, whether by negligence or intentional oversight 1 am not sure. But after three + years
trying to get this to court it makes a person wonder. I have tried to talk to my attorney by phone, but he
will not return my calls, 1 have sent him registered mail and it is returned to me marked (/REJECTED)
By Mr. Haskins. My only other option is totryw address the court, 1 can only hope you have the time to
read my fads.
In the Baldwin case cited by both attorneys Mr. Young states that the court cited (D UE D1LEGENCE)
As a factor where the aggrieved parties could have found the alleged fraud with due diligence
(such as going thru a Title Company.) We the plaintive in the (Pickering IU S.X) case, felt like we
hired a title company namely, our attorney Mr. Young, to advise the clients as to the meaning of
Judge Jenkins ruling. If a title company gives a client the wrong information they are at fault, and must
pay any damages the clienVincurred. The same applies to our attorney who misrepresented to the clients,
' Judge Jenkins ruling' ~Tn We 'court 'clerks finding's 'he "sfafes (Hat neither ~parfy~<5ffers~cx starting ~date ~as~to
the time when we discovered the alleged fraud. I discussed this at length with Mr, Haskins and he still
neglected to put it in court.
We discovered the fraud at the (Chamberlain / Young) trial (date April and May of 2001). When
Judge Scott Daniels sat on the witness chair and stated in his opinion after reading Judge Jenkins ruling
That Mr. Young owed Vacation Pay to all Plaintiffs in the Pickering I U.S.X. case. This was the time 1
found out he owed vacation pay. I contacted Mr. Haskins concerning the possibility of a law suit to
recover lost monies. The STARTING DATE for the clock to start on the statue of limitation was
May 2001. In my opinion we the plaintiffs in the Pickering / Young trial were diligent in hiring our
attorneys, Mr. Young and his associates to evaluate Judge Jenkins ruling and had every right to rely on
their opinion. In fact not a right but an obligation to trust them. (BALDWIN / BURTON) 850 p2d 1188
(1993) saying that the start time is measuredfrom the time the fraud is DISCOVERED. I can only hope
we get our day in court in front of a jury of our peers, Win, Lose, or Draw that is all we can ask.
Thank you.
Ronald Chilton
Copys sent to : James Haskins
Utah State Bar

/y
^
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with BM&T. Pickering decision at 5,40. Judge Jenkins found that none of the plaintiff
steelworkers were employed by USX as of January 1,1988. Section 502(a)(3) remedies were to
be measured in context of the 1987 BLA and Pension Agreements as if steelworker plaintiffs
were terminated when Geneva was sold to BM&T on August 31,1987.
After Judge Jenkins' decision, a settlement for $47 million was reached and a meeting
was held with the steelworkers regarding the settlement. The settlement was approved by all the
steelworkers and the money was paid out to each steelworker in two payments. The final
payment was made in March 1996. The Plaintiffs' claims all relate to the settlement agreement
and the Defendants' handling thereof.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2002, Plaintiffs filed the present law suit, which some Plaintiffs by and through
different counsel later amended by the third amended complaint. One group of Plaintiffs are
represented by Haskins & Associates. These Plaintiffs have dismissed their claims. The other
group of Plaintiffs are represented by Hill, Johnson & Schmutz ("HJS Plaintiffs"). The HJS
Plaintiffs filed the third amended complaint which is the operating complaint for the present
second motion for summary judgment. The HJS Plaintifs allege six causes of action,
specifically, (1) fraudulent misrepresentation, (2) legal malpractice-breach of contract, (3) legal
malpractice—breach offiduciaryduty, (4) legal malpractice—negligence, (5) accounting, and (6)
breach of trust/breach offiduciaryduty cause of action.
On April 6, 2005, the Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Defendants also

4

249-250 (1986). In other words, unsupported opinions and conclusions will not defeat summary
judgment. Robertson v. Utah Fuel Company, 889 P.2d 1382,1388 n. 4 (Utah App. 1995);
Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983). A party is required to come forward with
admissible evidence to support their claims. Preston v. Lamb, 436 P.2d 1021, 1022 (Utah 1968).
FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION
The First Cause of Action alleged by the Plaintiffs in the Third Amended Complaint is
"Fraudulent Misrepresentation." The Plaintiffs claim the Defendants misrepresented that the
"Plaintiffs would receive in the proposed settlement everything Judge Jenkins awarded to the
'bellwether' plaintiffs in the USX case, and more" because the settlement did not include any
amount for vacation pay to be paid in 1988 and "other elements and components of the
compensation awarded by Judge Jenkins to the 'bellwether' USX plaintiffs." (Third Am. Compl.
fflf 38 and 39).
Defendants move for summary judgment on this issue for two reasons. First, the claim
was not pled with particularity as required by Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
particularly in light of the fact that this Court already ruled that Judge Jenkins did not award
vacation pay for 1988 and the claims based upon this alleged misrepresentation have been
dismissed. Second, there is no evidence, and Plaintiffs have provided none, to support the
statement that "other elements and components" awarded by Judge Jenkins were not included.
At trial, Plaintiffs would be required to prove each clement of their fraud claim by clear and
convincing evidence and must, therefore, meet that same standard in opposing summary
judgment by coming forward with evidence from which a reasonable jury could find the

13
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dismissed with prejudice on May 31,1994, and January 3, 1995, respectively. Pickering

§1132{a>(3 V1985), equitable relief would include "an award of back pay (wages, sick leave.
vacation pay, incentive p&y or Giber employee compeu&acion) equdl to me conipensadon [him or
ber] would have received during the periods of recall r o ^^TDIOYTP?7!* 3i Oe^ie^s. *. !e£3 anv
amounx of income eamea by jnhn or ner] througn other employment during mose same periods.'5
See e.g„ Pickering decision at 56
Section 502(a)(3) remedies were to be measured m context of the 1987 BLA and Pension
Agreement a*s if the steslworker plaintiff verc terminated **uen 3cxicv'a v/as sold to BIvl&T on
August 3L 1987, Under the 198? BLA,. sn employee w&« entitled to aftiU^a?s v»catton o&v to
be paid the next calendar year if the employee was employed for six consecutive months in any

t&ea the employee forfeits tHe righi to receive vacation benefiis. BLa. at § 12-A -3. The BLA
was amended h> Appendix R to permit eligibility if one of ihree condidons was satisfied, eimer
"H) The emt?lovep' is recced to wor% in 198T> ^?^ Th^ ^rnt*-ovee %,forted bet^e^n Jivri? 1 5
1936, and July 3 i. 1986, or (3) Tne employee satisiiea the eligibility provisions of Section 12-Ai -b of the Collective Bargaining Agreement" Appendix 31 is slleiU o:; ibs issus of fOifeit
judge jenkms iound xhat USX sold the Geneva $i?M plane ro B?s*r. Manufactory and
lectooiogy ^Mcc.t; euecave Augi&i Jx, i9& >. ins steelworxer union, umiea bieelwor&ers or
America (the Union) ratified the June 8 agreement and June 12 collective bargaining agreement
with BM&T. Pickering decision at 55 40. None of die plaintiff steelworkers were emnloved bv
USX as of January L i%8.

M£MORAi>fr,I^ DHCf.S*:CHv

^
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opposition were without merit, The Defendants expanded significantly on these arguments at the
hearing.
The Plaintiffs had no opportunity to reply under the procedural rules to the Defendants
supplemental affidavits and additional twelve exhibits. The Defendants, as the moving party*
determined the scope of their motion for summary judgment Only two issues were raised by the
Defendants motion. To permit the Defendants to expand the scope of their motion for summary
judgment in their reply would be against the "letter and spirit" of the summary judgment rule and
permitting summary judgment to be "a vehicle of injustice." Accordingly, the Court concludes
that the scope of the Defendants motion for summary judgment is limited to two issues,
' specifically, (1) whether the Plaintiffs were entitled to received vacation pay and (2) whether the
Plaintiffs were entitled to attorney's fees, However, should summary judgment be revisited with
a proper pleading providing the undisputed facts and applicable law for each cause of action, the
Court may grant summary judgment on some of the causes of action that were argued at the
hearing.
A
VACATION PAY
Defendants argue the Plaintiffs were not entitled to receive vacation pay accrued in 19S73
to be paid out in 1988, because section 12-A-3 of the BLA provides that such vacation pay is
forfeited if the employees are no longer employed there on January 1$ 1998. In Pickering, the
court found that all of the steelworkers were terminated on August 31,1987, when USX sold the
Geneva steel plant to BM&T, Since no employee worked at USX on January 1,1998, no
employee qualified for the vacation pay accrued in 1987, to be payable in 1998.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
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In opposition, the Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to vacation pay that accrued in
1987, because Appendix R to tbe BLA amended the eligibility requirements for 1987 vacation
pay and therefore, the forfeit provision did not apply. Under Appendix R the Plaintiffs only had
to satisfy one of the criteria to qualify for deferred vacation pay in the next year. Therefore, the
Plaintiffs became eligible for deferred vacation pay in 1988, that had been vested or accrued in
1987. Specifically, the Plaintiffs argue that Appendix Q, II, reflects that in light of the
"continuing concern" shared by "the Union and the Company/' that USX assured the Plaintiffs
that the criteria introduced via Appendix R would remain and did remain in place with respect to
vacation years 19874988.
In reply, the Defendants'argue that Appendix R only related to 1987 vacation eligibility
and has no bearing on 1988 vacation pay. Defendants argue that Appendix Q5II had "absolutely
nothing to do with vacation pay, but only constituted a joint commitment by USX and the Union
to participate in the work of the Geneva Advisory Board to study and review the feasibility
regarding "market conditions for Geneva as a steel-making facility." Defendants argue that there
is nothing in the six steelworkers' affidavits providing that they were ever assured that Appendix
R concerning 1987 vacation pay would remain in effect for 1988 vacation pay.
Under the 1987 BLA, an employee was entitled to a full years vacation pay to be paid the
next calendar year if the employee was employed for six consecutive months in any year. If an
employee "quits, retires, dies or is discharged prior to January 1 of the vacation year" then the
employee forfeits the right to receive vacation benefits. BLA at § 12-A-3. The BLA was
amended by Appendix R to permit eligibility if one of three conditions was satisfied, either "(1)
The employee is recalled to work in 1987, (2) The employee worked between June 15, 1986 and

MEMORANDUM DECISION
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July 31,1986, or (3) The employee satisfied the eligibility provisions of Section 12-A-l-b of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement." Appendix R is silent on the issue of forfeit
Reviewing § 12-A-i-b of the BLA, to be eligible for vacation pay in 1987, an employee
must be employed for six months. However, suchrightis forfeited if the employee "quits,
retires, dies or is discharged prior to January I of the vacation year" then the employee forfeits
therightto receive vacation benefits. BLA at § 12-A-3. Appendix R amends the eligibility
requirements to include two additional ways to be eligible for vacation pay, but is silent on the
forfeit issue. Although the Plaintiffs desire that the Court view Appendix R as striking the
forfeit exception, the Court cannot do so. Appendix R addresses eligibility and therefore,
amends 12~A-l~b to include two additional ways to be eligible. However, this increase in
eligibility does not strike or amend the forfeit language, Appendix Q also does not strike or
amend the forfeit language. Without express language striking or amending the forfeit language,
the Court must read the BLA as a whole, which includes the forfeit language of § 12-A-3, The
Court concludes that any vacation that might have accrued in 1987, to those eligible was not
payable in 1988 because such vacation pay was forfeited when they were all effectively
discharged on August 3I, 1987, which was prior to January 1,1988. As found in Pickering,
none of the plaintiff steel workers were employed by USX as of January 1,1988, Therefore, this
Court concludes that none of them were entitled to vacation pay accrued in 1987> that was
payable in 1988, Accordingly, no genuine issues of material fact exist and the Defendant is
entitled to summary judgment on the limited issue of whether (lie Plaintiffs were entitled to
vacation pay accrued in 1987, to be paid out; in 1988.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
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FILED

IHIRD DISTRICT COURT

Ronald J. Chilton
214 East 1350 North
Lehi,Utah 84043
PRO-SE

29KNOV-S PH2--38
WEST JORDAN DEPT.

David L. Glazier
939 East lOOOSouth
Springville, Utah 84663
PRO-SE
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

Ronald J. Chilton, et ah,
Plaintiff

)
)
)

Civil No.
030105887
Judge Stephen Roth

)
Memorandum in support of
v.
;) certain plaintiffs motion for
)
reconsideration of the courts
ALLEN K.YOUNQ YOUNG,
;I first entry of summary
KESTER&PETRO, GERRY L.
])
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The defendants in this case are the attorneys who represented about 1800
former steel workers at U.S.X. Corp. Geneva works Steel Plant in a lawsuit
lasting over 8 years and two trials before Honorable Judge Bruce Jenkins,
after the first trial, Judge Bruce Jenkins ruled in 1992 that USX had violated
ERISA by failing to recall categories of plaintiff steel workers during the
period following the end of the work stoppage on Jan. 31, 1987, until USX
sold Geneva to Basic Manufacturing & technology on Aug. 31, 1987. After
the second trial, Judge Jenkins issued his decision in 1995 (the Jenkins
Decision) ruling that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover certain benefits
from USX as though they had worked from 2/1/87 thru 8/31/87. Judge
Jenkins ruled that 22 of the 24 bell weather plaintiffs whose case's were
typical of the other approxenly 1700 steel Workers were entitled to an award
of back pay) WHICH INCLUDES WAGES, SICK LEAVE, VACATION
PAY, INCENTIVE PAY OR OTHER EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION.
Equal to the amount they would have received at USX during the period
between 1/31/87 and 8/31/87 . No, one is arguing Judge Jenkins ruling, it
stands by it's self, as it is, for what it is . What is being argued is the
interpretation of the ruling. Everyone agrees on what he ruled, WHICH
INCLUDES WAGES, SICK LEAVE, VACATION PAY, INCENTIVE PAY,
OR OTHER EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION, AND BENEFITS, AS
THOUGH YOU HAD WORKED.
Allen Young knew on 6/19/95 Nine days before the settlement meeting the
USX WORKER WERE AWARDED ACCRUING PENSION THRU
8/31/87 and ACCRUING BENEFITS thru 2/1/93 (See EXHIBIT -1-)
Everyone knows the BASIC LABOR AGREEMENT is a contract between
USX and UNITED STEEL WORKERS OF AMERICA No one including
Honorable Pat Brian has the right to change the Honorable Federal Judge
Bruce Jenkins ruling and words. All parties have to live with in the FOUR
CORNERS OF THIS CONTRACT. The Basic Labor Agreement is very
specific, giving the Company, USX the right to manage its business as it
sees fit, as long as it does not violate the Basic Labor Agreement
(EXHIBIT 2 PAGE 24, Section 3, 3-2) which reads, The rights to
manage the business and Plants and to direct the working forces include
the right to hire, suspend and DISCHARGE FOR PROPER CAUSE
or transfer and the right to relieve employees from duty because of lack
of work or for other legitimate reasons.
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Again the defendants either willfully or mistakenly misquote the BLA
SECTION 12 (a-3). This SECTION is very clear and plain, it states it's a
A forfeit clause that pertains to an employee who (QUITS, RETIRES,
DIES, OR IS DISCHARGED). NOT FOR ANY OTHER REASON Tf
for an example as the defendant state, IF AN EMPLOYEE WAS NOT
WORKING JANUARY 1, OF THE VACATION YEAR, WHAT HAPPENS
TO ALL THE EMPLOYEES WHOSE SCHEDULE HAS THEM OFF ON
JANUARY 1 ? (Do those employees forfeit there accrued vacation, OF
COURSE NOT. THEY NEVER HAVE BEFORE WHY NOW. THE
JUDGE ORDERED IT AS WE HAD WORKED . This is why you Mr.
Burbidge and the Defendants can not use a line or a word or a sentence out
of context. You must read the WHOLE SECTION with the rest of the
BLA. To get the true meaning of the BLA. Again on page five on your
motion dated 10/24/06 Mr. Burbidge crosses the line by saying Judge
Jenkins said all STEEL WORKERS were lawfully terminated (with which
we agree,) and then in the same breath says all STEAL WORKERS were
discharged. (WITH WHICH WE DON'T AGREE.) Mr. Burbidge knows the
BLA is very specific about the steps required for discharge. ( NOBODY
WAS DISCHARGED NOR AFFECTIVELY DISCHARGED). The problem
is the Defendants know the forfeiture language is for quit, die, retire or
discharged for proper cause. The defendants keep trying to throw
discharged in the courts face, this in essence was the mistake Honorable Pat
Brian made when he listened to the defendants SAY, " All the Steelworkers
were discharged, and his ruling states "AFFECTIVELY DISCHARGED."
HONORABLE JUDGE PAT BRIAN HAD NO RIGHT TO CHANGE
TERMINATED TO EFFETELY DISCHARGED, by doing so he made
an erroneous mistake, granting the defendants first motion for summary
judgment. By doing so he also erred in granting their second motion for
summary judgment. By granting the first motion for summary judgment he
removed all issue pertaining to the 2 nd motion for summary Judgment. As I
have told the court before, and I will say it again, ( I do not blame
Honorable Judge Brian for making this mistake, I blame both the defendants
attorney and the plaintiffs attorney for not making the issue of terminating,
and discharged as used in the BLA clear to the Honorable Judge Brian. As
to Mr. Burbidge saying Ronald Chilton is now PRO-SE ten months after
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the early part of 2004. At this time because of the letters sent to the court by
Chilton, the plaintiffs won, when Honorable Pat Brian refused to grant the
first motion of summary judgment to the defendants on 12/24/03.
I Hired Mr. Evan Schmutz the early part of 2004 after being coaxed by
other clients and Mr. Schmutz. Evan neglected to do as he promised his
clients he would do. The clients done all we could do to get him to keep his
promise, when he refused, I Ronald went around Mr. Schmutz and sent a
letter for help to the court. Neither Haskins who was my first attorney, nor
Evan who was my 2nd attorney done what they promised. Therefore when
Evan withdrew as my council Chilton filed to go pro-se and David Glazier
soon followed. We filed our Reconsideration Motion immediately within
10 days. As for voluminous briefing and lengthily oral arguments, " That is
a Joke." Mr. Burbidge used most of the court time in both of the Motion
Summary Judgment. while Mr Schmutz done nothing. NOW, finally after
Chilton & Glaizer went Pro-Se , Evan has filed his motion for
reconsideration and an objection to defendants Motion to Strike Chilton &
Glazier Motion for Reconsideration. As for Chilton and Glazier being
grossly tardy, this is more of Mr. Burbidge hog-wash and gibberish.
Mr. Burbidge knows when the defendants filed their first MS J they were
Adamantly persuasive that all USX employees were discharged. Now the
plaintiffs have proven they were not discharged, but terminated due to the
plant closing, Mr. Burbidge has changed his position to terminated. But still
tries to use the forfeit language of discharge on termination. No where is
there any language in the BLA which says forfeiture of benefits if
terminated. The defendants continually say " If you were not working on
January first you are not entitled to vacation pay that year. (What about the
100s of employees whose working schedule had the employee off on Jan.
first Did they forfeit their vacation pay. NO-NO-NO. THIS HAS BEEN
A PRACTICE FOR 40 + YEARS TO HAVE PEOPLE OFF DUE TO
WORK SCHEDULE ON January the first of every year.
In defendants Exhibit C on page 11 the attorney Mr. Burbidge again
misquotes the BLA on page 90 section 12 (a-3) Mr. Burbidge says, while
the BLA provides that working a certain amount of time in 1987 Entitles a
steel worker to vacation pay in 1988. Burbidge says: "This is only true if
you worked Jan. the first 1988", Nowhere in the BLA does it say this.. .It is
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a tigment ot Mr. Burbidge's imagination. Mr. Burbidge misquotes the
BLA... Section 12 (a-3) of the BLA is very clear and plain. Mr. Burbidge
read what is written, not what you would like it to say.. .It says an employee
even though otherwise elegible under this sub section A-3 FORFEITS THE
RIGHT TO RECEIVE VACATION BENEFITS UNDER THIS SECTION
IF HE QUITS, DIES, RETIRES OR IS DISCHARGE FOR PROPER
CAUSE; prior to Jan. 1 of the vacation year. Since no one quit, died, or
was discharged, THIS FORFEIT LANGUAGE DOES NOT APPLY.
When the BLA is read in the right light, as it was intended, It completely
invalidates all of Mr. Burbidge's deduction, and arguments on this issue.
Another Misquote of Mr. Burbidge, on page 12 line 5 of his ruling, you
misquote Honorable Judge Jenkins saying, he only awarded benefits
received in 1987. This is total complete balderdash. This is not what he
said. He awarded BENEFITS EARNED AND ACCURDED IN 1987, "AS
IF YOU HAD WORKED* (In at least 22 places int Judge Jenkins
ruling.) Some of these accrued benefits continue for up to TWO YEARS &
MORE after the date of sale. 8/31/87. Mr. Young knew that some of these
accrued benefits continued until 1993. (See exhibit one.) As far as
section B of Burbidge's motion, (the attorney fee claim). Not one of the
plaintiffs looked into any crystal ball, and said, (Judge Jenkins would award
attorney fees.)(Pickering / USX). It was the defendant attorneys who told
USX the judge would probley award attorney fees if the case went to
adjudication. What the plaintiffs complained of was the fraudulent misuse
of these funds. No attorney has the right to syphon off the top of any award
in an out of court settlement, of any fees until that money is distributed to all
clients. Then the attorney gets his continuency fee at that time.. .NOT
BEFORE.
NO one except Mr. Burbidge and his clients fanticises m Mever Never
Land, they misconstrue what is said, they misquote the BLA. He has
attacked my handicaps and attacked my integrity, saying," Chilton has
been in court over 35 times and went pro~se in some of those cases. SO
WHAT How many times has Burbidge been to court? It does not matter.
What matters is the fact he has to stoop to this kind of garbage to try to win
his case. SORRY Burbidge I will not stoop to your level All we have ever
ask in the last
Five and one half years is our day in court. It is not the pro-se plaintiffs
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afraid of the motion to reconsider. If you are sure of the position you are
defending, you have nothing to worry about. I am sure of my position. And
I know the Honorable Judge Roth will make the correct decision now he has
a copy of Judge Scott Daniels deposition-Allen Young deposition- Mountain
View Transcript -Judge Jenkins ruling- the BLA. And assorted documents.
The defendants position, is that no benefits were paid after 8/31/87 is not
right.
As to page 13 again Mr. Burbidge you are putting words in Honorable
Judge Jenkins mouth. True, he did say we were terminated as of 8/31/87.
He never said, We were not entitled to VACATION PAY under
Section 12A-3, because we were terminated. As Mr. Burbidge says, the
language of the BLA Section A-3 relates to discharge prier to Jan 1,1988.
The problem with Mr. Burbidge scenario is, he keeps getting terminated and
discharged mixed up, using the two words as though they are the same.
NOT SO. Termination is an act by the company in its normal course of
business. The employee has no input to this action according to the BLA.
Vacation is an accrued benefit the same as pension, sub pay, profit sharing,
incentive pay. These and other benefits are accrued over a period of time,
and are payable when due. In the case of pension they are accrued over a
period of many years, and are payable when a person reached retirement.
They are not lost when the company terminates an employee. The same
holds true for sub pay benefits, they are accrued over a period of time, and
are not lost upon tennination. They go on for years after termination.
Vacation pay is accrued over a period of time, and are only paid when they
become due. In other words the following year. These are all accrued
benefits and are not LOST upon termination. If you use Mr. Burbidge
reasoning, that because you were TERMINATED you were
EFFECTIVELY DISCHARGED, so you FORFEIT your BENEFITS...
THIS IS TOTALLY UNTRUE!!!
Come on Mr. Burbidge, your arguments on forfeiture do not make any
sense. Forfeiture was written for the express purpose of quit, die, retire, or
discharge, not for any other reason.
When Mr. Young and his Associate's stood on the floor at the
settlement meeting and held Honorable Judge Jenkins Ruling in their hands,
saying, "In our heart of hearts we believe this settlement which we have
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Jenkins Ruling, they the defendants took all of USX obligations on their
selves. They negotiated this settlement with USX and sold it to their clients
thru a lie, by saying 100% + MORE. Here is the promise 100 % + MORE
where is our money? That's what we want to Know! As you say Mr.
Burbidge the Plaintiffs attorney was lacking in his arguments of the BLA.
That is why we are asking the court for a reconsideration.

DATED this_l__day of November, 2006
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Civil No. 030105887
Judge Stephen Roth

DEFENDANTS5 JOINT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
STRIKE MOTION OF "CERTAIN PLAINTIFFS" FOR RECONSIDERATION
OF THE COURT'S FIRST ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT (VACATION
PAY ISSUE) AND OPPOSITION TO A PORTION OF DEFENDANTS' JOINT
MOTION TO STRIKE THE MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION OF
RONALD J. CHILTON AND DAVID L. GLAZIER

Defendants Allen K. Young, Young, Kester & Petro, Jonah Orlofsky, Plotkin,
Jacobs & Orlofsky, Ltd., Gerry L. Spence, Lynn C. Harris, and Spence, Moriarity &
Schuster (hereinafter jointly referred to as "Counsel") jointly file this memorandum in
support of their motion to strike the motion of the Plaintiffs represented by Hill, Johnson
& Schmutz (the "HJS Plaintiffs") to reconsider the Honorable Pat B. Brian's decision
rendered September 22, 2005 granting Counsel's first motion for summary judgment on
Plaintiffs' vacation pay claim, and to strike the HJS Plaintiffs' opposition to Counsel's
joint motion to strike the motions for reconsideration filed by Ronald J. Chilton
("Chilton") and David L. Glazier ("Glazier").

INTRODUCTION
The Defendants in this case (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Counsel") are
the attorneys who represented over 1,800 former steelworkers at USX Corporation's
Geneva Works steel plant in a titanic battle with USX lasting over eight years and through
two lengthy trials before the Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins, in both of which Counsel were
successful for their clients. After the first trial, Judge Jenkins ruled in 1992 that USX had

2

violated ERISA by failing to recall categories of Plaintiff steelworkers during the period
following the end of a work stoppage on January 31, 198' /" i mtil I JSX sold Geneva to i->
Basic Minerals and Technologies, Inc. ("BM&T") on August 31, 1987. After the second p
trial, Judge Jenkins issued his decision in 1995 (the "Jenkins Decision") ruling that all but Ct
two of the 24 "bellwether" Plaintiffs uhose claims were consider* cl to be 1 ypical of the \
different categories of the remaining Plaintiffs were entitled to recover back pay from &
USXjdimng varying p e r i ^ s ^ e t w e e n j ^

3UL2S2-that Judge J

Jenkins ruled the be] Iv 'ether h idividual Plaintiffs shoi ild have beei I recalled , less income^"
earned by the bellwether Plaintiffs from other sources during the damage periods. The c\
amount of damages the bellwether Plaintiffs were entitled to recover and the damage ( #
claims of the remaining many hundreds of steelworkers remained to be tried.1 / '
As a result of this remarkable effort, Counsel were finally able to obtain a / )
settlement which obviated the need for hundreds of trials over a period of several y ears,. > 3
Under the Settlement Agreement, USX Corporation agreed to and did in fact pay $47 / V
Million in cash in two installments in September 1995 and March 1996 and agreed to / ">
various pension benefits for the steelworkers. The settlement with USX gave the 1 S
steelworkers everything that Judge Jenkins' Decision would have given them after many / 7
more years of litigation plus $3,714 Million above actual damages based upon Counsel's I <y>

1

For example, it remained for each individual steelworker not only to prove the amount
of his or her damages, but (except for the bellwether Plaintiffs) to prove when he or she would
have been recalled to work by USX following the end of the work stoppage on January 31, 1987
if USX had not been motivated by a desire to interfere with the steelworkers' pension benefits.
3

argument to USX that Judge Jenkins would probably ultimately award the steelworkers j
attorneys' fees, although in ERISA actions the court has discretion whether to award fi
attorneys5 fees to either party and attorneys' fees are not to be awarded as a matter of P

H

course.

After foil disclosure of the terms of the settlement in written documents and during
a lengthy meeting held with the steelworkers at Mountain View High School on June 28,^
1995, the 1,677 settling steelworkers unanimously approved the settlement in writing and
later each, in writing, released Counsel from any liability in connection with the CE
settlement. The steelworkers were paid every dime of their settlement.2 W
Despite the truly landmark victory won by Counsel for their clients, a small
minority of the steelworkers filed this lawsuit in July 2001 - - a foil six years after the
settlement - - making meritless claims against attorney Allen Young concerning the
settlement that all steelworkers unanimously accepted so many years ago. Three years
later, in 2004, the majority of the Plaintiffs obtained new counsel, Hill, Johnson &
Schmutz ("HJS"), and filed a Third Amended Complaint adding the remaining Counsel as
Defendants nine years after the settlement.
The genesis of the lawsuit, and the principal claim originally asserted by Plaintiffs
against Counsel, was that they misrepresented that the USX settlement would give the

2

Of the original approximately 1,892 Plaintiff steelworkers, the claims of approximately
200 retired steelworkers had been dismissed by Judge Jenkins' first decision in 1992 because
they had retired prior to the work stoppage. USX paid $5,000 to each retiree in 1993 to settle
their claims.
4

Plaintiffs everything that the Jenkins Decision would give them and more, but that

'

representation was allegedly false because Judge Jenkins allegedly awarded Plaintiffs

£

1988 vacation pay but the settlement did not. On September 22, 2005, Judge Pat B. Brian t
issued his Memorandum Decision (the "First Brian Decision"), a copy of which is

Y

attached hereto as Exhibit A, granting Counsel summary judgment dismissing that claim. £
Judge Brian ruled that because Judge Jenkins had ruled in the USX case that all of the

&

steel workers were lawfully terminated as USX employees when USX sold the Geneva

7

plant effective August 31, 1987, no steel workers were entitled to vacation pay in 1988 d
because under the Basic Labor Agreement between USX and United Steelworkers of ^f
America (the "Union") a steelworker was not entitled to vacation pay in 1988 if he or she /
was discharged prior to January 1,1988.

(I

Counsel thereafter filed a second joint motion for summary judgment on the

/ X.

Plaintiffs' remaining alleged claims for fraud, legal malpractice-breach of contract, legal /
malpractice-breach of fiduciary duty, legal malpractice-negligence and accounting. In

/<

response to the motion, the 38 Plaintiffs represented by Haskins & Associates, having had /
their claims for 1988 vacation pay which generated the lawsuit dismissed by Judge Brian, ,
voluntarily dismissed their claims with prejudice. The remaining approximately 180

/ -

Plaintiffs represented by HJS attempted to stay in court by asserting a hodgepodge of

f%s

supposed wrongdoing by Counsel which they argued entitled them to relief The

/ 9

remaining Plaintiffs resorted to asserting new claims in opposition to the second summary
judgment motion that were not even alleged in their Third Amended Complaint.
5

^Z

ARGUMENT

THE HJS PLAINTIFFS HAVE WHOLLY FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE
ANY BASIS FOR RECONSIDERING JUDGE BRIAN'S DECISION.
The claim which gave birth to this lawsuit was the Plaintiffs' erroneous notion that
under Judge Jenkins' decision in the USX case all of the steelworkers were entitled to
vacation pay in 1988 and that because the USX settlement did not include any amount for
1988 vacation pay, Counsel's representation to the steelworkers that the settlement gave
them everything that Judge Jenkins' decision would have given them after many more
years of litigation was false. The Plaintiffs asserted claims for fraud, legal malpracticebreach of contract, legal malpractice-negligence and legal malpractice-breach of fiduciary
duty based upon Counsel's alleged failure to obtain 1988 vacation pay as part of the
settlement. After lengthy briefing and argument, Judge Brian granted summary judgment
dismissing Plaintiffs' 1988 vacation pay claims on September 22,2005. Judge Brian
correctly ruled that the steelworkers weie only entitled to 1988 vacation pay if they were
still employed by USX as of January 1,1988. Because Judge Jenkins had ruled that all of
the steelworkers were terminated when USX sold the Geneva steel plant to Basic
Minerals and Technologies, Inc. effective August 31,1987, the steelworkers were not
entitled to 1988 vacation pay.

8

When the HJS Plaintiffs opposed the second summary judgment motion months
after the first summary judgment motion was decided, they did not seek to have Judge
Brian reconsider his decision on the vacation pay claim. Now, one year after Judge
Brian's decision, the HJS Plaintiffs have jumped on the bandwagon of pro se Plaintiffs
Chilton and Glazier to belatedly argue that Judge Brian incorrectly ruled that the Plaintiffs
were not entitled to 1988 vacation pay under Judge Jenkins' decision because they were
discharged as employees when USX Corporation ("USX") sold the Geneva steel plant
effective August 31, 1987 &&± tM^Twere-iK) longer employed omJaquary 1, 1988, which
was a requirement to receive>1988 vacation pay ./Unlike Chilton and Glazier, tne HJS
Plaintiffs make no attempt to have the court reconsider Judge Brian's decision on
Counsel's second motion for summary judgment.4
The HJS Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration on the vacation pay claim is made
on the very same basis as the Chilton and Glazier motions for reconsideration on that
claim: That Judge Jenkins determined that all of the steelworkers' employment had been
terminated as of August 31, 1987 at the time of the Geneva sale, but that under the Basis
Labor Agreement ("BLA") between the Union and USX a "discharge" is supposedly

4

Perhaps this is because, as the court will see when it hears and determines Counsel's third motion
for summary judgment on the remaining breach of fiduciary duty claim, the HJS Plaintiffs attempt to
essentially ignore Judge Brian's second decision by improperly reasserting (under a breach of fiduciary duty
rubric) the very same factual claims that Judge Brian has already dismissed.
9

different than a "termination." Although the HJS Plaintiffs concede the interpretation of
the BLA was a question of law for Judge Brian to decide [HJS Pis' Memo, at 2-3], they
erroneously argue Judge Brian's interpretation of the BLA was wrong.
The one notable difference between the motions for reconsideration filed by
Chilton and Glazier on the vacation pay claim and the motion for reconsideration filed by
the HJS Plaintiffs on the vacation pay claim is that the HJS Plaintiffs do not argue that
any newly discovered evidence justifies reconsideration.5 Rather, the HJS Plaintiffs
attempt to justify their extravagantly tardy motion for reconsideration by castigating
Judge Brian over and over again in their memorandum for supposedly not interpreting the
provisions of the Basic Labor Agreement (the "BLA") as a whole and ignoring the
provisions of the BLA concerning "discharge."6
The short and dispositive answer to this baseless and remarkably unfair criticism
of Judge Brian is that the HJS Plaintiffs5 legal argument concerning the purported
meaning of "discharge" under the BLA is an entirely new argument that was not made in
any fashion by the HJS Plaintiffs before Judge Brian. Indeed, glaringly absent from the
5

Chilton and Glazier erroneously argued that a pay stub which supposedly showed that a single
steelworker received 1988 vacation pay constituted new evidence. As pointed out by Counsel in their
motion to strike, that pay stub shows no such thing and it was not newly discovered.
6

Courts recognize that a "discharge" of an employee means "termination" of the
employee. See, e.g., Fishgold v. Sullivan Dry Dock & Repair Corp., 66 S. Ct 1105,1112 (1946)
("discharge normally means termination of the employment relationship or loss of a position.");
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Brown, 540 P.2d 651, 654 (Ariz. 1975); Conner v. Phoenix Steel Corp.,
249 A.2d 866, 869 (Del. 1969) ("'discharge' normally means the termination of the employment
relationship
").
10

new argument that the HJS Plaintiffs have belatedly raised is not based upon any relevant
new evidence, but could have been asserted had the HJS Plaintiffs' counsel chosen to do
so in opposition to the first summary judgment motion 16 months ago. They should not
now be permitted to try on for size a new argument that could have been made at the time
the first summary judgment motion was considered by Judge Brian.
The HJS Plaintiffs attempt to justify raising their new argument for the first time
16 months after their original opposition by telling the court that they could not have
anticipated that Judge Brian would rule against them on the 1988 vacation pay claim on
the basis that they had been discharged from their employment prior to January 1, 1988
and, therefore, were not entitled to 1988 vacation pay under Judge Jenkins' decision. The
HJS Plaintiffs are not being candid with the court. Their argument flies in the face of,
and seriously distorts, the record in this case.
The parties are in agreement that in his decision Judge Jenkins ruled all of the
steelworkers were terminated by USX as of August 31, 1987 when USX sold Geneva and
that their rights to benefits had to be determined as if they had remained active employees
who were terminated at that time. [See Defs' memo, in support of motion to strike Chilton
motion at 17.] In turn, Section 12A.3 of the BLA provided that:
An employee even though otherwise eligible under this Subsection A,
forfeits the right to vacation benefits under this Section if he quits, retires,
dies, or is discharged prior to January 1 of the vacation year. [Emphasis
added]

12

The sole argument asserted by Counsel for summary judgment on the vacation pay
claim was that because Judge Jenkins ruled all employees were lawfully terminated as of
August 31, 1987, they were not entitled to 1988 vacation pay under Section 12A.3 as they
had been terminated, or the in the language of Section 12A.3 "discharged", prior to
January 1, 1988. [Attached hereto as Exhibit C is an excerpt of the relevant pages of
Counsel's memorandum in support of the first motion for summary judgment.] This is
the precise basis upon which Judge Brian granted summary judgment on the
vacation pay claim.
In their opposition memorandum and at oral argument, the HJS Plaintiffs did not
say a word about any supposed difference between "termination" and "discharge" or raise
in any fashion their new argument that although the steelworkers were "'terminated", they
were not "discharged". Instead, the HJS Plaintiffs tacitly acknowledged that on its face
Section 12A.3 of the BLA barred their 1988 vacation pay claim, but argued that Section
12A.3 was amended by Appendix R and Appendix QII to the BLA. [An excerpt of the
relevant pages of the HJS Plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition to the first summary
judgment motion is attached hereto as Exhibit D.]
Appendix R entitled "Letter Agreement on 1987 Vacation Eligibility" only related
to 1987 vacation eligibility, did not in any way affect the requirements of Section 12A3
of the BLA and had no bearing whatsoever on 1988 vacation pay, as Judge Brian
correctly determined. [See Judge Brian's 9/22/05 Decision at 10-11.] Appendix QII to the
13

Exhibit L

Defendant Youngfs Settlement Summary for Bill Wright

Stffteiqept Siromary fpr Ml Wright
Sign in front of a witness and return on or before February 26,1996, only if it is correct.
Your Second Payment Gross Amount is $17,978.00' (before taxes and attorney's fees).
By looking at the page four Chart entitled Final Gross Payout by Group, you can determine your
category. You can also see how flic two payments combined total the amount promised in our meetings and
in the release agreements. The total amount received was increased by the return of any costs you paid and
it may be increased if you received an award from the hearings process. The total amount received is reduced
by your attorney's fees of 33 1/3%, unpaid costs and the hearings fees charge, if any. Also, some taxes
(usually not enough) have been and will be withheld from your gross installment cheeks by USX The
following paragraphs detail your upcoming check:
Calculation of Second Installment Check (before taxes):
Second Payment Gross Amount:
817*978.00
Less Unpaid Costs ($1,100 - Costs paid):
mm
$17,978.00
Less Atty's Fees (1/3 of Gross -XJnpd Costs):
$11,98533
Less Attorney's Fee on Pension*
$0.00
Less Hearings Fee (if applicable)
$100,00
Total costs
$100.00
Add Hearings Amount (if any)A
+
Less Atty's Fee on Hearing Amt (1/3 of Amt)Hearing Amount subtotal

$11,985.33

$100.00
$11,885.33

$7,411.93

$2,437,31
$4,974.62

Gross Check Amount to You (before Taxes)

Mmpz
$16,859,95*

I, Bill Wright, do hereby accept and understand the breakdown set forth above and that my share
of thefinalsettlement proceeds arisingfiromPickering v.U.S.X. and related cases is $16,859.95.* I ask that
my check be mailed to the address above on or about March 4,1996, and I do hereby acknowledge that die
figures above are correct, and I do hereby release my attorneysfiromany claim relating to the settlement
SIGNED and DATED this > J - day of

st&J^A

_, 1996.

^
Address J^73

5o <3<&0&J

£SfRfDACTiB
Witnessed by:

itness name vwte&J^fa/tf^

a<J^i^LCf\^'
V

Z jjJrff if fa

#We reserve the right to collect additional attorney's fees on any definable benefit as a result of increased pension rights
received as a result of the Pickering litigation.
*We reserve the right to change this number if a significant calculation error or category error is made, only after notice
to and a meeting with the client.
A
A copy of Judge Daniel's brief ruling about your individual case, and the case in general, is available upon request.
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FINAL GROSS PAYOUT BY GROUP
2nd Payment
Mar. 1996

1st Payment
Sept. 1995

Plaintiff Groups
All payments are before taxes and attorneys' fees

J Total Amount

Total Payment per
Plaintiff *Befare taxes and
attorney's fees

j

1 $34,980,000.00

$10,475,00

1 $16,025.00

$26,500.00°

Recalled Idling Plaintiffs: ( 5 4 ) Those Union represented
plaintiffs who were recalled to keep the plant on hot idle on or after
j February 1,1987,

$4,744.00

$7,256.00

snlooo.oo®

$648,000.00

| Managers: (44) Management plaintiffs who were recalled or were
-working on or after February 1,1987,

$4,744.00

$12,000.00®

$528,000.00

Laid Off Managers: ( 1 7 ) Management plaintiffs who were laid off
1 priortoJuly 31,1986 snd who were not recalled to work on or after
j February 1,1987.

$13,045.09

$19,955.00

$33,000.00®

.$561,000.00

Recall Plaintiffs; ( 2 1 4 ) Union represented plaintiffs who were hid
off prior to Jury 3 J, 1986 and who were not recalled io work on or alter
j February 1,1987.

$11,75X00

[$17,978.00

$29,730.00®

$6,362,220.00

I $7,256.00 *

$12,000.00®

$336,000.00

Idling Plaintiffs: (1320) Those Union repj-escntedplaialifSflod
Ban-Exempt non-represented plaintiffs who were not recalled to mirk at
USX on or after February 1,1987, but who -were actively employed just
prior to the work stoppage on July 31,1986.

LaRoche: (28) Union representatives who were soki to LaRjoche
1 Industries m May, 1986.

• '

I
j

'

1 $4,744.00

$7,256.00

'

j Subtotal

j $43,4L5,22D.Q0,l, j

Costs
Gross Amount Awarded

$47,000,000.00

Fees

$45,194,269.00

Costs

$ 1.805.73 LOO

Calculation

divided by 3

Netto be divided

$45,194,269.00

j Attorneys Fees31

Hearings Awards

<D

1 $ 2,349,332.28" 1

j Minus Cost Charge®

$15,064,756.33 9

Total
1

®
@
®'

$ 1,805,731.00

!

$

570,283.28 "

j $47,000,000.00
.

I

Amounts may be increased by pension payments and hearings proceeds.
Attorney's Fees were taken from tliese amounts minus the cost charges only (See calculation above).
The Cost Charge came from amounts Subtracted from clients who did»not pay their costs. This sum was distributed by Judge Daniels as
part of the hearings proceeds. \
<
Fees were divided between Young & Kester, Spence, Moriarity & Schuster, Pfotkin & Jacobs, Lynn C. Harris, Doug Baxter, Vickie
Rhine, Michael Goldsmith, Bill Corbet and Howard Eglett

efendant Young's Hearing Worksheet for Idling Plaintiffs

Hearing Worksheet for TriJmgJgMntij
Settlement

Plaintiff

$36,072.00
0.53

Average Wage for years 1984-1986

x

194/365 days (percentage)

$ _

x

0,53

$19,118.00

Average Lost Wage (Gross)

$__

$ 1,500.00

Deductions: Wages Paid (2/16-8/31/87)

$__

$ 1.500.00
$16,118.00
1.644
$26,500.00

£_

Sub (2/16-8/31/87)

Total Gross Wage Loss
x

Compound Interest

$___

x

1,frH

Total Damages (inci.int&AttySF«»)

If your calculations exceed 526,500.00 then you should probably
request a hearing. If your calculations do not exceed $26,500.00 you
may still request a hearing if you haye special facts or circumstances
which may entitle you to additional money from the surplus fund.

D000002

Total Gross Payout bv Group
Everyone will be repaid up to $1,100.00 based upon what costs each plaintiff paid in addition to the payments listed below.
Plaintiff Groups
All payments axe before taxes and attorney's fees

1st Payment

2nd Payment
Feb/Mar, 1996

Total Payment per
Plaintiff *Be£ore taxes
and attorney's fess

Total Amount

Aug/Sept, 1995

I d l i n g P l a i n t i f f s : ( 1 3 1 6 ) Those Union represented plaintiffs,
J and non-Exempt, non~xcprescntcd plaintiffs who were not recalled to
work at USX on or after February 1,1987, but wbo were actively
j employed just prior to the work: stoppage on M y 31,1986-

$10,475.00

$16,075.00

$26,500.00*

$34,874,000.00

1 R e c a l l e d I d l i n g P l a i n t i f f s : ( 5 5 ) Those Union represented
j plaintifls who were recalled to keep Che plant on hot idle on or after
February 1, 1987.

$4,744.00

$7,256.00

$12,000.00*

$

660,000.00

M a n a g e r s : ( 5 0 ) Management plaintiffs who were recalled or
1 were working on or after February l a 1987.

$4,744.00

$7,256.00

$12,000.00*

$

600,000^00

L a i d O f f M a n a g e r s : ( 1 4 ) Management pkintifB who were
j laid off prior to December 31, 1986 and not recalled to work on or
after February 1,1987.

$13,045.00

$19,955.00

$33,000.00*

$

462,000.00

R e c a l l P l a i n t i f f s : ( 2 1 1 ) Union represented plaintiffs who „
j were laid off prior to July 31,1986 and who were not recalled to work
j on or after February 1, 1987.

$11,752.00

$17,978.00

$29,730.00*

$ 6,273,030.00

L a R o c h e : ( 2 8 ) Union represented plaintiffs who were sold to
j LaRoch.e Industries in May, 1986.

$4,744.00

1 $7,256.00

$12,000.00*

$

Subtotal

$43,205,030.00

*These amounts may be increased by pension

Costs

$ 1,841,400.00

payments and hearings proceeds if applicable.

i Reserve

Total
**Amonnts "will be increased by $500,000.00 if all claims are resolved by the date of the -second payment

i

]

336,00000

1

[$1,453,570.00** 1
$46,500,000.00** j

Exhibit G
Defendant Young's Hearing Worksheet for Idling Plaintiffs

Hearing Worksheet for Idling Plaintiffs
Settlement

Plaintiff

$36,072.00
0.53

Average Wage for years 1984-1986

x

194/365 days (percentage)

$_

x

0,53

$19,118.00

Average Lost Wage (Gross)

$ _

$ 1,500.00

Deductions: Wages Paid (2/16-8/31/87)

$ _

$ 1.500.00

Total Gross Wage Loss

$16,118.00
1.644
$26,500.00

£__

Sub (2/16-8/31/87)

x

Compound Interest

$__

x

1.544

T o t a l D a m a g e s (IncI-Int&Atty'sFees)

If your calculations exceed $26,500.00 then you should probably
request a hearing. If your calculations do not exceed $26,500.00 you
may still request a hearing if you have special facts or circumstances
which may entitle you to additional money from the surplus fund.

D000002

Exhibit M

In The Third Judicial District Court Of Salt Lake County
West Jordan Department, State of Utah

Chi Wen, .ct-*//

SUBPOENA

Plaintiff,
vs.
^

Defendant

Case No. r)30i0^g8

7

YOU ARE COMMAM>ED:
[ ]
to appear is the Third District Cowl, West Jordan Department at 8080 S. Redwood Rd.,
West Jordan., Utah on the date and time specified below to testify in the above case,
[ ]
to appear at the place, date and time specified below to testify at the taking of a
osition in the above case,
t o ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ b r permit inspection and copying of the following documents or objects at
tie place, date and time specified below (list documents or objects):
,

-f

~r

[ ]

to permit inspection of t^foDowing]^

J
r c
i»t.o
«**.&
fz*"-.
*>//'
V/^-J^Z'rL
? * 7 _,
^4
-F
M.
PLACETS
*TT Xh -tjlf
DATE A&D TIME
V

Any organization not a party to this suit that is subpoenaed for the taking of a deposition shall
designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or other person who consent to
testify on its behalf, and may set forth, for each person designated, the matters on which the
person wi)l testify. Rule 30(b)(6), Utah Rules of CrvO Procedure.
•\

J-L-

~\

&

MKT^

* S § U I N ^ ^ a E ^ SIGNATURE
(check box below Vindicate title)
^t~i~~ Deputy Co^rt/berk
[XT * ® ^ fk^laintiff ^ fro - S x
[ ] Attorney for Defendant

-:m

DATE

B&n &U ckiUF* "l
,
/ fy & /?</-

^
&t>f~~ J /> *-^L

*1ht clerk shall issue a subpoena, signed but otherwise in blank, to a party requesting it, who shall complete h before
service. An attorney admitted to practice in the court in which the action is pending may also issue and sign a
subpoena as m officer of the ccrart Rule 45(*X3) 'Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Exhibit C
Ronald J. Chilton's Subpoena demand for inspection of documents, December 4,2006, Page 1 & 2
Subpoena

December 4,2006
Page 1 of 2

Dave Glazier Pro-Se
939 East 1000 South
Springville. Utah 84663
Telephone (801)885-2058
INTHE

Ronald J. Chilton Pro-Se
214 East 1350 North
Lehi.Utah. 84043
WA

4TH DISTRICT COURT. PROVO. STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY

Pickering
V
U.S.X.

SUBPOENA

Civil

87-C-838J

88-C-763J

91-C-636J

To: Allen K. Young
Address: 75 South 300 West
Provo, Utah
YOU ARE COMMANDED. To produce or permit inspection and copying
of the following documents at the place and date and time specified below:
The four boxes of Dr. Paul Randall exhibits, that you removed from the
Federal Court, in S.L.C. and all other document concerning::
Pickering/U.S.X. consolidated case Civil # 87-C-838J, Civil # 88-C-763J,
Civil#91-C-636J.
These files are needed in case # 03010S887 Chilton /Young
3rd District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah West Jordan Department
if necessary we would be happy to come to your office within the next 14
days, at your earliest convenience to inspect or copy this information.

Page -2-of 2
December 4,2006

Subpoena

Thank you:

Ronald X/Chilton Pro Se

ISSUING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE AND TITLE
(INDICATE IF ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF OR DEFEND.

In The Third Judicial District Court Of Salt Lake County
West Jordan Department, State of Utah

ft***/-A rh<LT*n<r-4

SUBPOENA

Plaintiff,
vs.
J

p

Defendant

) jjnn^

CaseNo. fl 1.f) 1 (? 11 7 7

-ttfisKfiiS

To:
YOU ARE COMMANDED:
[ ]
to appear in the Third District Court, West Jordan Department al 8080 S. Redwood RxL,
West Jordan, Utah on the date and time specified below to testify in the above case.
[ ]
to appear at the place, date and time specified below to testify at the taking of a
deposition in the above case.
(ropr6auc&or permit inspection and copying of the following documents or objects at
Bg"piace,Tdate and time specified below (list documents or objects):

\fiU<>~ a. ud Je>c ufti^M^prcJtJc^JL
do/as/i[ ]

/

<oF a./l

/

daca*n>j«Ts

y ,/a o . d//
•f

to permit
foflgw premises at the date and time specified belo^
srmit mspectiojtt
inspection of the following

0 t

T7»

?LACE

T~C~~Zr
yf^^i'i/

.;/

c>
/•'.
..
T~fl
V„ ,,
to
rf/^T
/ecf

;

* h~ ) - , .
eFl'ic^o

.-.

niTPiWTlTnU
?- h^/ oDATE
.AND TIME

Any organization not a party to this suit that is subpoenaed for the taking of a deposition phfrl)
designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or other person who consent to
testify on its behalf, and may set form, for each person designated, the matters on which the
person will testify. Rule 30(bX6"), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. /} f'cK 7 k - e ^ i V p

4&
(check box ssRw to i^ii^ate tMe)
~^f— DqjxityC^ii^Cfcrk
"'[>$ Atfesa^forPteintiff frc^s^
[ ] Attorney for Defendant

DATE

H

0 /

/ /? ^ ^ ~e -

x a

^

r^ n n
&l/i~J^AjL*

*Tbe clerk shall issue asubpoena, signed but otherwise in blank, to a parry requesting it, who shall complete it before
service. An attorney admitted to practice is tbe court in which the action is pending may also issue end sign a
subpoena as a& officer of the ccrort Rule 45(a)(3) Utah Rxales of Civil Proeediire.

5^/*V,<^

Exhibit N

s~

G6J'J"30 AH 11=52

u

'

^

^

*- V \

"Mi

Evan A. Schmutz (3860)
Theodore F. Linn (8234)
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C.
Jamestown Square, Suite 200
3319 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone (801) 375-6600
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RONALD J. CHILTON, et al,
Plaintiffs,
NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL
OF COUNSEL

v.
ALLEN K. YOUNG; YOUNG, KESTER &
PETRO; GERRY L. SPENCE; LYNN C.
HARRIS; SPENCE, MORIARTY &
SCHUSTER; JONAH ORLOFSKY;
PLOTKTN & JACOBS and John Does I - V,
individuals whose true identity is unknown to
the Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 030105887
Judge Stephen Roth

Defendants.

Evan A. Schmutz and the law firm of Hill, Johnson & Schmutz, L.C. hereby give
notice of their withdrawal as counsel for Plaintiff Ronald Chilton. There are no motions
pending and no trial date has been set. The last known address of the Plaintiff is:
Ronald Chilton
214 E. 1350 No.
Lehi, Utah 84043

t>

U

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant was raaitedAst-eiass-on*f4ou**{ AQ.t/A^u ^
to the following:
Burbidge & Mitchell
215 S. State Street
Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone: (801) 355-6677

2008

Julie\10 S.

cdiu&rWs
Ato,* S u i t e 4D0

Sa\r LiU^ ens' u-r. SHioi

Ronald Chiltor/Flaintiff in Pro Se
Designated forrhe Plaintiffs

IAJ

Michael SHQIAI\CK

S a i l Lake C)l 1, \xtah
Phdtfe Ctol) 53J.3773

p*$i<jtta.l*J

?HI/I
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f-oir %e

FlcuNiiffS
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